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ABSTRACT
The international community's efforts to promote the rule of
law and human rights in developing countries have been largely
unsuccessful. This record of disappointment is typically attributed to
a lack of political will for reform in the host societies. As a result, an
estimated four billion people worldwide are without access to human
rights, and suffer without recourse from discrimination, theft, and
other forms of physical and emotional harm.
In order to more effectively bring about reform, it is time for
rule of law promoters to draw upon the lessons of social science, and
particularly the study of social movements. This Article represents the
first effort to view the challenge of instilling political will for law
reform through the prism of social movement theory and its analysis
of events like the U.S. civil rights movement, the South African anti-
apartheid movement, and the Eastern European democracy
movement.
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This social movement analysis reveals substantial reason for
optimism about achieving significant law reform in developing
countries. Rule of law promoters must re-orient their approach and
begin supporting the existing and evolving grassroots law reform
organizations that mirror in key respects the organizations that have
proven to be the catalysts for change in social movements. Properly
supported, these organizations can grow and nurture the political will
for access to justice that is so desperately needed by billions of people
in the developing world.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Leah J. is a slender thirty-year-old Kenyan woman who is the
mother of two children, a daughter age six and a son age nine. She is
HIV-positive. In August of 2007, her husband, who was also HIV-
positive, died. The day she buried her husband on the land of their
rural home in the Kerio South region, Leah's father-in-law walked up
to her and insisted that she and the children leave immediately. Her
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sisters-in-law sneered to Leah, "We do not have enough land to bury
you here, too."'
In soft Kiswahili, Leah tells the story of how she and the
children fled to the city of Eldoret and stayed in the homes of
whichever friends would take them in for a few days at a time. Her
husband had not left a will, and she could not gain access to his small
pension from his work as a police officer, or to a bank account he had
held. Leah could not find work, and she and the children were often
hungry and without food. Leah routinely was separated from the
children when there was not enough room for everyone at a friend's
home. She could not afford mandatory school uniforms or lunch fees,
so the children attended school only sporadically. Leah soon learned
that her in-laws were trying to sell some of her husband's land.2
According to the laws of Kenya, none of this should have
happened. The country's Law of Succession Act clearly states that as
the surviving spouse, Leah had a life interest in her husband's land
and other property.3 Kenya is party to a wide array of human rights
treaties that aim to protect property rights, to guarantee due process,
and to prohibit gender discrimination. International agencies,
including the World Bank, the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID), and the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP), along with many international non-
governmental organizations, have spent significant resources in
Kenya and throughout the developing world in efforts to promote the
rule of law. These efforts include billions of dollars devoted to
1. Interview with Leah J. in Eldoret, Kenya (Jan. 8, 2009) (on file with
author).
2. Id.
3. Law of Succession Act, (1981) Cap. 160 § 35. (Kenya).
4. See, e.g., African Charter on Human and People's Rights, adopted June
27, 1981, art. 6, 21 I.L.M. 58, at 3 (entered into force Oct. 21 1986) [hereinafter
African Charter] (forbidding imprisonment except when under the authority of
established laws); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, opened for signature Dec. 18, 1979, art. 1-2, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13
(entered into force Sept. 3, 1981) [hereinafter Women's Convention] (prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of gender); International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, art. 1-3, 993
U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter ICESCRI (recognizing
property and labor rights); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, art. 1-3, S. Exec. Doc. E, 95-2 (1978), 999
U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR] (ensuring
political freedom and the right to self-determination).
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building court facilities, buying equipment, and training judges,
legislators, and police on the rule of law and human rights.5
But when Leah's legal rights were violated, she could not
afford access to a lawyer or the courts, and the police and other
government officials were not available to intervene to protect her or
her children. For Leah, the de jure law respecting her rights was a
mere paper tiger, and all the treaty signatures and investment by the
international community in Kenya's rule of law had zero effect. Her
story is echoed in the experiences of billions of other people in the
developing world who are no closer than Leah to achieving access to
justice, and as a result suffer through poverty, physical harm, and
regular humiliation.6
To date, the international community's efforts to instill the
rule of law and human rights in developing countries have been
guided by the disciplines of law and economics.7 Although the goal is
a worthy one, these law reform initiatives have been largely
unsuccessful, a record of disappointment typically attributed to a
lack of political will 8 for reform in the host countries. Since law and
economics have been demonstrably unable to solve the problem of
5. See, e.g., World Bank, Annual Report Year in Review 57 (2008) (World
Bank's expenditures in law, justice, and public administration); USAID, Fiscal
Year 2008 Agency Financial Report 16 (2008) (USAID's net costs for rule of law
and human rights programming); see also World Bank, Project Appraisal
Document on a Proposed Credit in the Amount of SDR 12.2 Million to the
Republic of Kenya for a Financial and Legal Sector Technical Assistance Project
10-11 (2008) (law reform expenditure in Kenya in the form of an $18 million
World Bank loan for a Kenyan Governance, Justice, and Law and Order Sector
(GIJLOS) reform program that included funds for improving court management
systems, education for judges, and support for the Parliament and Attorney
General in drafting and enforcement of commercial laws).
6. Comm'n on Legal Empowerment of the Poor, UNDP, Making the Law
Work for Everyone 19 (2008) (estimating that four billion people worldwide are
excluded from the rule of law).
7. See, e.g., Thomas Carothers, The Rule of Law Revival, 77 Foreign Aff.
95, 99 (1998) (arguing that in recent years foreign policy experts increasingly
propose that rule of law is the solution to many of the world's troubles).
8. The most accurate definition of the term "political will" when used by
commentators in the rule of law and human rights context is the demonstrated
credible intent of political actors to take meaningful action towards reform. See,
e.g., Sahr J. Kpundeh, Political Will In Fighting Corruption, in Corruption and
Integrity Improvement Initiatives in Developing Countries 91, 92 (Sahr J.
Kpundeh & Irene Hors eds., 1998) (defining political will as "the demonstrated
credible intent of political actors (elected or appointed leaders, civil society
watchdogs, stakeholder groups, etc.) to attack perceived causes or effects of
corruption at a systematic level").
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missing political will, it is time for rule of law implementers to draw
upon the lessons of sociology, and particularly the study of social
movements. This Article represents the first effort to view the
challenge of instilling political will for law reform through the prism
of social movement theory, which provides a fresh yet historically
and theoretically sound approach to growing the rule of law and
human rights in developing countries. 9
Part I of this Article will summarize the significant historical
and theoretical support for the concept of the rule of law, which has
led to billions of dollars of investment in programming devoted to
promoting human rights and the rule of law in developing countries.
Part II will review the situation in Leah J.'s home country of Kenya
as a case study of how the prevailing formal law and human rights
treaties have little or no impact on the lives of most of the country's
citizens, especially women and the poor. Part III outlines the largely
unsuccessful record of the prevailing approach to developing rule of
law, an approach that focuses on state institutions and a top-down
method for promoting reform. Most rule of law practitioners and
commentators blame that record of failure on a lack of political will
to embrace the called-for changes in the host countries. Finally, Part
IV explores how the principles derived from the sociological study of
social movements can be applied to create more effective strategies
for promoting the rule of law and human rights. That social
movement analysis shows that there is substantial reason for
optimism about achieving significant law reform in developing
countries. If rule of law promoters can re-orient their approach
toward supporting existing and evolving grassroots law reform
organizations, these organizations can grow and nurture the political
will for access to justice that is so desperately needed by Leah J. and
billions of others.
9. In this Article, the use of the metaphor of "growing" political will for the
rule of law is an intentional choice over similar terms such as "building" or
"implementing" the rule of law. As this Article discusses, rule of law efforts have
traditionally been dominated by the literal act of building courthouses and other
physical or procedural structures based on an external vision of how justice
should be applied in developing countries. The study of social movements shows
that much better results are likely to be obtained when efforts focus on nurturing
the natural process of indigenous advocates employing their superior
understanding of local conditions to "grow" their own version of law reform.
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II. THE POPULAR YET ELUSIVE RULE OF LAW
A. Introduction
The "rule of law" has long been considered to be the ideal
format for a governance model that limits state power in an
economically and socially efficient manner. Despairing of the limited
supply of philosopher-kings, Plato endorsed the rule of law: "[If law
is the master of the government and the government is its slave, then
the situation is full of promise and men enjoy all the blessings that
the gods shower on a state."'1 The Magna Carta famously promised
that no free man would be imprisoned or his property seized "except
for lawful judgment of his equals or by the law of the land."1" Max
Weber wrote extensively on the role that stable, predictable law
plays in enabling economic transactions leading to growth and
prosperity. 2 In modern Western democracy, there is no more
enduring maxim than the John Adams-drafted statement in the
Constitution of Massachusetts directing that the Commonwealth
would be a "government of laws and not of men." 3 Even the Marx-
influenced twentieth century historian E.P. Thompson boldly
pronounced the rule of law as "an unqualified human good."
14
As this section will discuss, there is a long-running debate
over the meaning of the rule of law that has left the scope of the
concept unresolved. Despite this uncertainty, there continues to be
strong support for including rule of law programming as a key
component of modern multilateral and bilateral investments in the
development of poor countries.
10. Plato, The Laws 715d (Trevor J. Saunders trans., Penguin Books 1970)
(360 B.C.).
11. Magna Carta, cl. 39 (1215).
12. 2 Max Weber, Economy and Society 641-900 (Guenther Ross & Claus
Wittich eds., 1978) (1914).
13. Mass. Const. part 1, art. XXX.
14. E.P. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters 266 (1975) ("[T]he rule of law
itself, the imposing of effective inhibitions on power and the defence of the citizen
from power's all-intrusive claims, seems to me to be an unqualified human
good."). However, Thompson never backed away from his lifelong insistence that
unjust laws need to be challenged. See, e.g., Daniel H. Cole, "An Unqualified
Human Good": E.P. Thompson and the Rule of Law, 28 J.L. & Soc'y 177, 197
(2001) (noting that Thompson "did not cease to rail against capitalism and unjust,
class-based laws [even] after he espoused the Rule of Law").
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B. Defining the Rule of Law
Despite the broad and enduring agreement on the value of
the rule of law, there has not yet been a similar consensus on what
exactly the rule of law entails.15 The World Bank, the key actor in
contemporary rule of law programming, articulates a four-part test:
(1) the government itself is bound by the law; (2) every person in
society is treated equally under the law; (3) the human dignity of
each individual is recognized and protected by law; and (4) justice is
accessible to all.'
6
The debate over the meaning of the rule of law tends to come
down to the question of whether the law invoked is "thick,"
encompassing broad social and economic goals, or "thin," meaning a
narrow guarantee of specific and predictable procedure. 7
Some scholars see the rule of law as a "thin" procedural
phenomenon, where clear and enforceable laws meet the
criteria as long as there is some minimal restraint on the power of
the state." As Joseph Raz argues:
15. See Order in the Jungle, Economist, May 13, 2008, at 95 (including a
comment by professor Dani Rodrick asking, "[aim I the only economist guilty of
using the term (rule of law) without having a good fix on what it means? Well,
maybe the first to confess it."); see generally Rachel Kleinfeld Belton, Competing
Definitions of the Rule of Law 21 (Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace,
Democracy and Rule of Law Project, Carnegie Papers No. 55, 2005), available at
http://www.carnegieendowment.orgffiles/CP55.Belton.FINAL.pdf (discussing the
challenge of defining rule of law by comparing two commonly used definitions:
one that emphasizes the function it serves; the other highlighting the
institutional elements needed to put it in place).
16. World Bank, Legal and Judicial Reform 1 (2002).
17. See Randall Peerenboom, Let One Hundred Flowers Grow, One
Hundred Schools Contend: Debating the Rule of Law in China, 23 Mich. J Int'l L.
472, 472 (2002).
18. See, e.g., Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, in the Authority
of Law at 210, 210-228 (1979) (Using F.A. Hayek's idea that when law is stripped
of technicalities, it means only that the government is bound by fixed rules,
which its citizens know and follow, in order to argue that the rule of law is just
one of the many virtues a legal system may possess, not to be confused with
democracy, justice, and human rights, for example) (1979); Brian Tamanaha, The
Lessons of Law and Development Studies, 89 Am. J. Int'l L. 470, 476 (1995)
(reviewing the field of law and development to examine the role that law plays in
developing countries, and the relationship and influence of modernization theory
and dependency on scholarship in law and development); Frank Emmert, Rule of
Law in Central and Eastern Europe, 32 Fordham Int'l L.J. 551, 563-68 (2009)
(forging a path between thin (which he defines as "formal") and thick (which he
defines as "substantive") approaches to rule of law by focusing on the
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[T]he rule of law is just one of the virtues which a legal
system may possess and by which it is to be judged. It is not
to be confused with democracy, justice, equality (before the
law or otherwise) human rights of any kind or the respect
for persons or for the dignity of man. A non-democratic
legal system, based on the denial of human rights, on
extensive poverty, on racial segregation, sexual
inequalities, and religious persecution may, in principle,
conform to the requirements of the rule of law better than
any of the legal systems of the more enlightened Western
democracies. This does not mean that it will be better than
those Western democracies. It will be an immeasurably
worse legal system, but it will excel in one respect: in its
conformity to the rule of law.
19
Most contemporary definitions of rule of law, however, include
respect for and enforcement of basic human rights20 and most rule of
law and development actors now encompass within their plans a
broad range of social objectives like health, education and gender
equality.2'
C. The Rule of Law and Development
In the 1960s, as many countries made the transition from
colonialism to independence, a "law and development" movement
emerged. The movement was based on the concept that the rule of
law would be an economic building block for these new nations, with
administrative law traditions of France and Germany, which rest on
requirements of legality, legal basis, and judicial review).
19. Raz, supra note 18, at 211.
20. See The Secretary General, Report of the Secretary General on the Rule
of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, 1 10,
delivered to the United Nations, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 23, 2004); USAID,
Guide to Rule of Law Country Analysis 5 (2008) (explicitly includes principles of
human rights in its definition of rule of law); see also Kleinfield Belton, supra
note 15, at 14-15 (discussing the revival of ideas of individual rights in defining
the rule of law). Since the Bank and others come to the rule of law question from
a perspective focused on its economic value, it should be noted that human rights
may have tangible economic value, since there is evidence of a strong empirical
link between civil liberties and the performance of government projects. See
Jonathan Isham et al., Civil Liberties, Democracy and the Performance of
Government Projects, 11 The World Bank Econ. Rev. 219, 228 (1997).
21. See World Bank, World Development Report 2006, at 13 (2006). For a
discussion of the trend toward incorporating social goals into development
strategies, see Kerry Rittich, The Future of Law and Development: Second
Generation Reforms and the Incorporation of the Social, in The New Law and
Economic Development 203, 203 (David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006).
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human rights and democratic development "spilling over" from
economic growth.22 As a U.S. law professor who was one of the law
and development promoters from that era says now, the premise was
that the U.S. model for legal structures could and should be
"transplanted" to other nations, chiefly through systems of legal
education: "If we could reform Chilean legal education to make it just
like ours, it was assumed this would provide what was wanted."23
By the early 1970s, this jurisprudential paternalism had
proven so unsuccessful that it was discredited by even its own
original proponents. Most notably, Marc Galanter and David Trubek
published an article in the Wisconsin Law Review revealingly
entitled "Scholars in Self-Estrangement," in which they pronounced
the law and development model as "naive and ethnocentric."24
In the early 1990s, law and development made a big
comeback under the guise of "the rule of law" or "law reform,"25 a
foundation of the aid strategies of major international development
investors, including most notably, the World Bank,26 the Inter-
American Development Bank,2 7 the United Nations Development
Program (UNDP), 28 and bilateral programs such as the U.S. Agency
for International Development (USAID).29 The key theoretical
impetus for rule of law efforts during this era came from the
22. David Trubek, The "Rule of Law" in Development Assistance, in The
New Law and Economic Development, supra note 21, at 74, 75, 78.
23. Leah Larson-Rabin, Happenstance and Memory: A Legacy of Law and
Development Scholarship and Policy in Legal Education, 25 Wis. Int'l L.J. 209,
212 (2007).
24. Marc Galanter & David M. Trubek, Scholars in Self-Estrangement:
Some Reflections of the Crisis on Law and Development Studies in the United
States, 1974 Wis. L. Rev. 1062, 1081 (1974).
25. I will use the terms "rule of law" and "law reform" interchangeably
throughout this Article in referring to these development interventions, and will
follow the prevailing practice in development discussions of considering these
terms to include the concepts of basic human rights, especially freedom from
discrimination on the basis of gender or ethnicity, access to judicial systems, and
legal accountability of state actors like the police.
26. See Kirsti Samuels, Rule of Law Reform in Post-Conflict Countries:
Operational Initiatives and Lessons Learnt iii, 1 (World Bank Social Development
Papers, Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Paper No. 37, 2006).
27. See Christina Biebesheimer, Institute for Latin American Studies,
Justice Reform in Latin America and the Caribbean: The IDB Perspective, in Rule
of Law in Latin America 99, 100 (Pilar Domingo & Rachel Seider eds., 2001).
28. UNDP, Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery - Rule of Law,
http://www.undp.org/cpr/we-do/security-reform.shtml.
29. USAID, supra note 20, at 14.
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neoliberal perspective, often referred to as the "Washington
Consensus," which held that private-sector economic development
was enabled by strong government institutions providing consistent
enforcement of laws, especially in areas of contract and legal title to
property.3" Indeed, despite the involvement of the global North legal
community through such programs as the American Bar Association
Rule of Law Initiative, 31 it is economists and not lawyers who have
been the chief source of talking points for the current wave of rule of
law promotion.32
One such economist is Amartya Sen, the Nobel Laureate
economist and one of the most widely recognized proponents of the
rule of law. He argues that development is a concept that goes
beyond mere economic well-being to embrace political freedom and
social opportunities.3 3 A personal witness to the devastating Bengal
Famine of 1942, Sen made one of his most compelling arguments for
individual freedom in his assertion that no nation with a functioning
democracy and free press has ever suffered a famine.34 Since
information flows freely in those settings and democratic
governments must respond to the will-and, presumably, outrage-of
the people, widespread suffering is averted.35
Sen's conclusion that freedom and economic and social well-
being are inseparable components of a country's development leads to
his embrace of the rule of law:
It is hard to think that development can really be seen
independently of its economic, social, political or legal
components. We cannot very well say that the development
process has gone beautifully even though people are being
arbitrarily hanged, criminals go free while law-abiding
citizens end up in jail, and so on. This would be as
counterintuitive a claim as the corresponding economic one
that a country is now highly developed even though it is
30. See, e.g., Erick Jensen, The Rule of Law and Judicial Reform: The
Political Economy of Diverse Institutional Patterns and Reformers' Responses, in
Beyond Common Knowledge 336, 347 (Erik K. Jensen & Thomas C. Heller eds.,
2003) (noting the role of the "Washington Consensus" in supporting rule of law
programming by multilateral development banks in an effort to advance private
sector development).
31. American Bar Association, Promoting the Rule of Law,
http://www.abanet.org/rol/about.shtml (last visited October 1, 2009).
32. See Larson-Rabin, supra note 23, at 217.
33. Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom 3-11 (2d ed. 2001).
34. Id. at 51.
35. Id. at 178-186.
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desperately poor and people are constantly hungry .... [So]
[iun answering the query, "What is the role of legal and
judicial reform in the development process?", we must at
least begin by noting the basic fact that legal development
is constitutively involved in the development process, and
conceptual integrity requires that we see legal development
as crucial for the development process itself.1
6
Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto has made his own
well-known argument for the rule of law, a distinctly capitalist
celebration of the economic empowerment that flows from clear and
enforceable property rights. De Soto reviewed the challenges faced by
the poor in countries such as Peru, Haiti, and the Philippines, and
concluded that the poor people whom he observed were severely
disadvantaged by the absence of an efficient system of regulating
property rights. The vacuum of verifiable title to property leads to
the inability to obtain credit for assets like houses and small
businesses, enforce contracts or conduct trade outside a very small
network.3 7 De Soto said that the dysfunctional legal systems of most
developing countries stifled entrepreneurship and growth, a point he
dramatized by demonstrating that it took 289 days of sustained
efforts to legally open a small garment workshop outside Lima.38 De
Soto found similar bureaucratic barriers in the other countries he
studied, and concluded that clear and legally enforceable titles, along
with transparent and straightforward licensing and contract
mechanisms, were the keys to development for the poor and their
countries.3 9 These same conclusions were echoed recently by the
UNDP's Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor, which was
co-chaired by de Soto and former U.S. Secretary of State Madeline
Albright.40
These arguments by Sen, de Soto, and others contributed to
extensive investments in multilateral and bilateral efforts designed
to promote the rule of law. The Vice President and General Counsel
of the World Bank reported in 2004 that the Bank had engaged in
over 600 rule of law projects.4' One calculation that same year
36. Amartya Sen, Address at the World Bank Legal Conference: Role of
Legal and Judicial Reform in Development 9-10 (June 5, 2000), available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAWJUSTINST/Resources/legalandjudicia
1.pdf.
37. Hernando de Soto, The Mystery of Capital 64-66 (2003).
38. Id. at 18-20.
39. Id. at 56-58.
40. Comm'n on Legal Empowerment of the Poor, supra note 6, at 15.
41. Robert Danino, Senior Vice President and General Counsel, World
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concluded that the World Bank alone had spent $2.9 billion on rule of
law projects since 1990,42 a figure consistent with the Bank's report
of spending nearly $500 million per year on Rule of Law loans from
2003-2008, and almost $5.5 billion per year in a sector it labels "Law
and Justice and Public Administration."43 The U.S. General
Accounting Office (which changed its name to the U.S. Government
Accountability Office in 2004) reported in 1999 that the U.S. alone
had spent $970 million on rule of law programming, much of it in
Latin America, in just one five-year period in the 1990s.4 USAID
reported that it spent $14.3 million on "rule of law and human
rights" in 2007.4' These agencies have claimed that their rule of law
programming addresses not only economic development and human
rights, but also poverty, democratization, and peacemaking. 6
D. The Limitations of a Rule of Law Approach to
Development
The combination of extravagant claims and significant
investments has led some to argue that the rule of law concept has
been oversold. The rule of law is described, usually sarcastically, as
"the motherhood and apple pie of development economics, ' 7 the
"silver bullet" in development,48 the "holy grail"of good governance,4 9
and "the preeminent legitimating political ideal in the world today." °
It has been pursued "with missionary zeal"5 and packaged like "a
product on late night television."52
Bank, Address at the Conference on Human Rights and Development Towards
Mutual Enforcement 15 (Mar. 1, 2004), available at http://siteresources.world
bank.orgINTLAWJUSTICE/214576-1139604306966/20817164/HumanRights
NewYork030104.pdf.
42. Trubek, supra note 22, at 74.
43. World Bank Annual Report, supra note 5, at 57.
44. U.S. General Accounting Office, Rule of Law Funding
Worldwide For Fiscal Years 1993-1998, at 3 (1999), available at
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/ns99158.pdf.
45. USAID, supra note 5, at 16.
46. Samuels, supra note 26, at 3.
47. The Economist, supra note 15, at 83.
48. Gordon Barron, The World Bank and Rule of Law Reforms 2 (2005).
49. Jensen, supra note 30, at 336.
50. Brian Z. Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law 4 (2004).
51. Rosa Enhrenreich Brooks, The New Imperialism: Violence, Norms and
the "Rule of Law," 101 Mich. L. Rev. 2275, 2276 n. 2 (2003).
52. Belton, supra note 15, at 21.
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Thomas Carothers, Vice President for studies at the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, is one such critic. He argues
that despite the investment of rhetoric and dollars in "rule of law"
efforts in developing countries, zealous faith in this concept masks
the reality of its limits as a promoter of human rights in developing
countries. He writes:
Unquestionably, [rule of law] is important to life in
peaceful, free and prosperous societies. Yet its sudden
elevation as a panacea for the ills of countries in transition
from dictatorships or statist economies should make both
patients and prescribers wary. The rule of law promises to
move countries past the first, relatively easy phase of
political and economic liberalization to a deeper level of
reform. But that promise is proving difficult to fulfill.
53
Although generally it is agreed that elements of rule of law
are positively associated with economic development,54 there is very
little in the way of rigorous evaluation of the billions of dollars in
investments in rule of law programming.5 Carothers and others have
pointed out that there is scant evidence that the expensive efforts in
recent decades to implement the rule of law have succeeded in
improving either the economic or political climates in the host
countries .56
53. Carothers, supra note 7, at 95.
54. See Daniel Kaufman, World Bank Inst., Rethinking Governance 17
(2003); see also Ronald J. Daniels & Michael Trebilock, The Political Economy of
Rule of Law Reform in Developing Counties, 26 Mich. J. Int'l L. 99, 101-104
(2004-2005) (reviewing similar studies that have found a link between rule of law
and economic development). But see Richard Posner, Creating a Legal Framework
for Economic Development, 13 The World Bank Research Observer 1, 3 (1998)
(questioning the direction of causality between legal reform and development and
suggesting that development inspires law reform as much as law reform inspires
development).
55. See Linn Hammergren, International Assistance to Latin American
Justice Programs, in Beyond Common Knowledge, supra note 30, at 290, 301; see
also Samuels, supra note 26, at 15 (highlighting the lack of empirical data
measuring rule of law outcomes, and the resulting difficulty in crafting accurate
indicators); Jensen, supra note 30, at 361-65 (arguing that the current use of
impact indicators at the expense of empirical research has led to a lack of credible
baseline data against which judicial reform projects can be measured).
56. See Thomas Carothers, Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad 6 (Carnegie
Endowment for Int'l Peace, Democracy and Rule of Law Project, Carnegie Papers
No. 34, 2003); see also Gary Goodpaster, Law Reform in Developing Countries, 13
Transnat'l. L & Contemp. Probs. 659, 661 (2003) (pointing out that it is unclear if
such reforms result in lasting improvement in the lot of many); Brooks, supra
note 51, at 2280-2283 (citing the failure of rule of law initiatives to prevent
26 COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW [41:13
III. THE LAW AS A PAPER TIGER-THE CASE OF KENYA
A. Introduction
From her vantage point in rural Kenya, Leah J. would no
doubt agree with the skepticism about the impact of rule of law
interventions. Although there is justifiable concern about the absence
of rule of law in the developing world as a whole, it is useful to zoom
in to look at the example of how rule of law and human rights exist-
or don't-at the ground level in Kenya. Leah J.'s home country offers
a stark example of discordance between the law on paper and the
true application of rights on the ground.
Kenya is home to a formal court system, is bound by statutes
and a constitution, and has signed human rights treaties that protect
a broad range of fundamental rights. Despite the hallmarks of rule of
law reforms, however, in terms of economic development and civic
freedom, Kenya is below average. In the UNDP's 2009 Human
Development Index, Kenya ranked 147th out of 182 countries.57
Freedom House, a non-governmental organization dedicated to
expanding political and economic freedom, and which issues annual
rankings of political rights and civil liberties, listed Kenya as "Partly
Free" in 2009; only 42 countries were listed with the inferior ranking
of "Not Free."58
The World Bank's Governance Matters study, which
evaluates and compares countries on good governance indicators,
ranks Kenya in the lowest percentile range for political stability, rule
of law, and control of corruption.59 Kenyan human rights lawyer Dr.
Connie Ngondi Houghton told the country's Commission on Legal
Empowerment of the Poor in 2006, "The edifice of the legal and
justice system ... is not designed to cater to the interests of the poor,
violence and build an independent judiciary in Russia, Kosovo, and other states
transitioning to democracy); Alvaro Santos, The World Bank's Use of the "Rule of
Law" Promise in Economic Development, in The New Law and Economic
Development, supra note 21, at 253, 285 (pointing to no clear empirical evidence
showing the success of judicial reform); Samuels, supra note 26, at 17
(highlighting the lack of information on long-term outcomes in the field).
57. UNDP, Human Development Index (2009), http://hdr.undp.org/
en/statistics.
58. Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2009, at 25 (2009), available at
http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fiwO9/FIW09_Tables&GraphsForWeb.pdf.
59. World Bank, Governance Matters 2009: Worldwide Governance
Indicators 1996-2008 (2009), http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/sc-
chart.asp.
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women, children, workers, refugees and other vulnerable groups . ..
[T]he entire system is broadly insensitive and exclusionary."
60
Kenyan Vice President Stephen Kalonzo Musyoka, in September
2008, conceded publicly that the majority of Kenyans have no access
to justice through the courts.61
With respect to the disconnect between abstract guarantees
of justice and the ability of the poor to actually access these
guarantees, Kenya represents the norm among developing countries,
not the exception. Countries throughout Latin America, Africa, and
Eastern Europe struggle to provide access to justice, 62 and a recent
review of African police forces found widespread corruption.63 Poor
police response, predictably followed by vigilante justice, occurs in
much of Africa.64 The Kenyan government is not alone in largely
ignoring the human rights treaties it has pledged to uphold. Of the
42 countries that Freedom House rated as "Not Free" in its 2009
rankings, all but seven are parties to the ICCPR.65 A study of African
Union states members' responses to recommendations of the African
Commission on Human and People's Rights from 1994-2004 showed
an overall lack of compliance with the recommendations.66 Oona
60. Comm'n on Legal Empowerment of the Poor, UNDP, Summary Report
of Kenya National Consultation 5 (2006).
61. Press Release, Stephen Kalonzo Musyoka, Vice President, Kenya, Legal
Aid and Awareness Scheme Launch (Sep. 18, 2008) (on file with author).
62. See, e.g., Daniels & Trebilock, supra note 54, at 123 ("With respect to
legal aid and access to justice, in most countries in Latin America, Africa, and
central and Eastern Europe, public defender and related legal aid programs were
and remain highly incomplete in their coverage, woefully under-resourced, and
often quite ad hoc in nature .... "); see also William C. Prillaman, The Judiciary
and Democratic Decay in Latin America (2000) (generally examining the inability
of reform efforts in Latin America to create a strong, efficient, and accessible
judiciary).
63. Alice Hills, Policing Africa 36, 122, 166, 181-82 (2000).
64. Jennifer Widner, Courts and Democracy in Post Conflict Transitions: A
Social Scientist's Perspective on the African Case, 95 Am. J. Int'l L 64, 70 (2001).
65. Compare Freedom House, supra note 58, at 22-28 (2009) (list of
countries considered "Not Free"), with Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for
Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Signatories
and Parties 1-3 (2009), available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/
MTDSGNolume%20I/Chapter%201V/IV-4.en.pdf (listing the parties to the
ICCPR).
66. See Frans Viljoen & Lirette Louw, State Compliance with the
Recommendations of the African Commission on Human and People's Rights, 101
Am. J. Int'l L. 1, 4-7 (2007) (noting that in only 14% of the communications
examined did states fully comply with the recommendations of the African
Commission).
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Hathaway's quantitative analysis found no human rights treaty for
which ratification by a country was associated with that country's
engaging in better human rights practices, and several treaties
where ratification was actually associated with worse practices.6 7
B. Looks Good on Paper-"Rule of Law" in Kenya
On paper, the prospects for the rule of law in Kenya look
promising: Kenya has a formal court system that dates back to its
colonial roots and decides cases based on Kenyan statutory law,
Kenyan and English common law, tribal law, and Islamic law.6" Its
formal judicial system consists of five levels of Magistrates' Courts, a
High Court, and a Court of Appeals.69 Magistrate courts handle about
90% of the cases before the judiciary.70 An ethnic group's customary
law is allowed to apply in civil cases only if it is not "repugnant to
justice and morality or inconsistent with any formal law."7' Kadhis'
courts rule on the basis of Sharia law and work alongside
magistrates in areas with significant Muslim populations.72
Kenya is a party to the ICCPR, which prohibits
discrimination on the basis of gender,73 mandates fair criminal
procedures,74 and insists on equal rights during and after marriage.7 5
Kenyans are guaranteed these and a generous variety of other rights
by virtue of their country's acceding to the ICESCR,76 the African
Charter,77 and the Women's Convention. 7' Kenya's constitution
67. Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111
Yale L.J. 1935, 1976-2000 (2002).
68. Hunton & Williams, Legalbrief Africa, Customary and Islamic Law and
Its Development in Kenya, (Oct. 11, 2004), http://www.legalbrief.co.za/
article.php?story=20041010212108281.
69. Id.
70. International Comm'n of Jurists, Kenya: Judicial Independence,
Corruption and Reform 36 (2005).
71. The Judicature Act, (1977) Cap. 8 § 3(2). (Kenya).
72. The Kadhis' Courts Act, (1967) Cap. 11 § 5. (Kenya) ("A Kadhi's court
shall have and exercise the following jurisdiction, namely the determination of
questions of Muslim law relating to personal status, marriage, divorce or
inheritance in proceedings in which all the parties profess the Muslim
religion .. ").
73. ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 26.
74. Id. arts. 9, 14.
75. Id. art. 23.
76. ICESCR, supra note 4.
77. African Charter, supra note 4.
78. Women's Convention, supra note 4.
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includes guarantees of protection against gender discrimination 9 and
a prompt and transparent adjudication of criminal charges."0 Its
statutes clearly prohibit assault,8 ' which can include domestic
assault, and protect rights of inheritance by widows and daughters.
8 2
Amidst much fanfare, the Kenyan government in 2006 also enacted
the Sexual Offences Act criminalizing rape and sexual harassment, 3
and the attorney general promised an ambitious program of training
for police and judges on the new law. 4
C. Kenya's Failure to Recognize and Enforce the "Rule of
Law'
Despite Kenya's substantial affirmations of justice, most
Kenyans lack access to the rule of law. The discordance between
formal guarantees of the rule of law and the human rights crisis on
the ground in Kenya demonstrates that the only way rule of law is
going to be established and maintained in Kenya is if there is first
substantial political will to embrace and enforce human rights
guarantees.
79. Constitution, Art. 82 (2001) (Kenya). However, this provision goes on to
contradict the spirit of its broader language by excluding the anti-discrimination
guarantee from applying in family law, succession cases, and instances where
customary law applies, leading one commentator to conclude that "the result is
that at no time are [Kenyan] women guaranteed protection from sex-based
discrimination." Bonita Ayuko & Tanja Chopra, Justice for the Poor & Legal
Resources Foundation Trust, The Illusion of Inclusion 27 (2008).
80. Constitution, Art. 83 (2001) (Kenya).
81. Penal Act, (2003) Cap. 63 § 251. (Kenya).
82. The Succession Act, (1981) Cap. 160 § 35. (Kenya). But see Penal Act,
(2003) Cap. 63 § 2. (Kenya) (indicating limitations of The Succession Law,
including a bar on widows being the sole administrators of their husbands'
estates and allowing exemptions for certain communities, including Muslims,
based on tradition).
83. The Sexual Offences Act, No. 3 (2006), §§ 3, 23. (Kenya).
84. U.S. Dep't of State, Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Kenya
(Mar. 11, 2008), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100487.htm. But see
The Sexual Offences Act, No. 3 (2006), § 38. (Kenya) (containing a disturbing
"poison pill" that may discourage full reporting: if a complaint is found to be false,
the complainant is subject to punishment equal to that for the offense originally
alleged. It appears that a great deal of faith in the judicial system is necessary for
a victim to risk this kind of boomerang result by coming forward to file a
complaint.).
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1. The Struggle for Women's Rights
Women in particular suffer from a lack of legal protection, as
domestic violence,85 sexual assault,86 forced marriages,8 7 land theft,88
and economic exploitation 89 are all perpetrated against Kenyan
women with near in-punity. Female circumcision is prohibited by
law, but remains a routine practice in many Kenyan communities. 90
Women perform an estimated 80% of Kenya's agricultural work, but
own only 5% of the land.9' After an extensive 2002 investigation,
Human Rights Watch reported that in Kenya, "[women's] rights to
own, inherit, manage, and dispose of property are under constant
attack from customs, laws, and individuals.., who believe that
women cannot be trusted with or do not deserve property.
", 92
85. See Kristin Kalla & Jonathan Cohen, Open Soc'y Inst., Ensuring
Justice for Vulnerable Communities in Kenya: A Review of HIV and AIDS-
Related Legal Services 22 (2007), http://www.soros.org/initiatives/
osiea/articles-publications/publications/kenya_20070416/kenya_20070416.pdf
(citing breathtaking rates of domestic violence, including 94% of women in
Nairobi reporting having experienced at least one episode of domestic violence in
the previous year); see also IRINnews.org, Kenya: Sexual and Domestic Violence
Prevalent (Oct. 27, 2005), http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=56856
(citing a demographic health survey carried out by the Ministry of Planning in
2003 that revealed that at least half of all Kenyan women had experienced
violence since the age of 15, with close family members among the perpetrators).
86. U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 84.
87. Tanja Chopra, Promoting Women's Rights By Indigenous Means: An
Innovative Project in Kenya, Briefing Note (World Bank/Just. for the Poor 2007)
July 2007, at 2, available at http:/siteresources.worldbank.org/
INTJUSFORPOOR/Resources/J4PBriefingNoteIssueJuly.pdf.
88. Connie Ngondi-Houghton, UNDP, Comm'n on Legal Empowerment of
the Poor, Access to Justice and the Rule of Law in Kenya 27-28 (2006), available
at http://www.undp.org(LegalEmpowerment/reports/National%20Consultation
%20Reports/Country%2OFiles/15-Kenya/15_3 Access_to_Justice.pdf.
89. See World Bank, Justice for the Poor: Kenya (2008),
http'J/worldbank.org/html/extdr/thematic.htm (follow "Law and Development"
hyperlink; then follow "Justice for the Poor" hyperlink; then follow "Country
Programs" hyperlink; then follow "Africa" hyperlink and finally the "Kenya"
hyperlink) (discussing how under Kenya's law women have a right to inherit
their fathers' and deceased husbands' land but "cultural, informational and
institutional barriers" prevent the vindication of these rights, causing the
increased marginalization of women while gender discrimination in the workforce
causes women to earn less and work in inferior conditions).
90. Ayuko & Chopra, supra note 79, at 23.
91. Ngondi-Houghton, supra note 88, at 27.
92. Janet Walsh, Human Rights Watch, Double Standards: Women's
Property Rights Violations in Kenya 1 (2003) available at
http://www.hrw.org/en/node/12352/section/8; cf. Social Watch, Gender Equity
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Leah J.'s case discussed at the beginning of this Article
represents a disturbingly common phenomenon that occurs when a
Kenyan widow, often left with young children after a husband
succumbs to HIV/AIDS, either is forced to marry her brother-in-law
or is driven off the land that would otherwise support her family.93 In
Kenya, gender-based violence is disturbingly common, but successful
prosecution of the crime is disturbingly rare. A hospital-based
advocacy program in western Kenya that supports survivors of
gender-based violence as they pursue criminal charges recently
reported little success in several dozen cases.94 Even after advocates
convinced police to waive their typical fees charged to persons
wishing to file the report of a crime, women who had survived assault
faced a cumbersome bureaucracy, the alleged perpetrators were
allowed to recontact and intimidate them, and the women faced
regular indifference from police and prosecutors throughout the
process.95 A recent review of women's legal status in the pastoralist
societies in Northern Kenya reported rampant domestic violence, but
such pervasive police indifference to the crime that women said they
had stopped bothering to report their assaults.96 The same study
concluded that women's lack of access to basic legal protections
"demonstrates that the inclusion of women through international
conventions, domestic legal reform and gender quotas in
participatory processes is illusory."97
2. The Struggle to Create a Fair Judicial System
The Kenyan court system suffers from a number of systemic
problems. The judiciary is plagued by undue influence from the
executive branch 98 and a reputation for overall corruption. 99 Despite
Index: 2008 (2008) available at http://www.socialwatch.org/sites/
default/files/GE12008-eng.pdf (showing that unfortunately, gender equity is a
significant challenge for most other modem nations as well, as recent global
evaluations show that economic gender equity is elusive even in developed
countries).
93. Chopra, supra note 87, at 2; see also Betty Potash, Widows in Africa, in
Widows in African Societies 1, 17, 20 (1986) (discussing severely limited options
available for widows in many Kenyan societies).
94. Report by Lucy Wanjiru of Centre for Assault Recovery, Eldoret,
Kenya, January, 2009 (on file with author).
95. Id.
96. Ayuko & Chopra, supra note 79, at 14.
97. Id. at 7.
98. See Kim Matthews & William H. Coogan, Kenya and the Rule of Law:
The Perspective of Two Volunteers, 60 Me. L. Rev. 561, 568 (2008) (discussing the
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the Ministry of Justice's dismissal of twenty-three judges for
corruption in 2003, °00 the African Union's African Peer Review
Mechanism in 2006 still found "a visible lack of independence of the
judiciary" in Kenya.'0 ' Given that the President of Kenya has
regularly wielded his power to transfer judges to unattractive
outposts when he disapproves of their rulings, this was not
surprising. 10 2 Moreover, the judicial system is unable to redress a
number of serious abuses. Kenyan police are notorious for shooting
criminal suspects0 3  and shaking down citizens for petty
bribes.' °4 The Kenyan National Commission on Human Rights
estimated there were 700 extrajudicial killings by police in 2007, and
13 Nairobi robbery suspects were shot and killed in one day alone.0 5
Police rarely are arrested or prosecuted for excessive use of force.'0 6
predominance and long-standing history of the authoritarian president state in
Kenya).
99. Id.; see also Transparency International, The Kenya Bribery Index
2007, at 18 (2007) (reviewing data from a survey that shows 92% of the
judiciary's clients face bribery); see also Tanja Chopra, Justice for the Poor,
Reconciling Society and the Judiciary in Northern Kenya 16 (2008) (explaining
that a 21.3% rate of all bribes occurring in the judiciary during a 2006 survey has
led to a general perception that bribery plays a key role in courts and one cannot
expect justice without the necessary funds).
100. Marc Lacey, A Crackdown on Corruption in Kenya Snares Judges,
N.Y. Times, October 26, 2003, at A4.
101. U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 84; see also Matthews & Coogan, supra
note 98, at 570 (visiting U.S. attorney who attempted to practice in Nairobi in
2006 and 2007 pronounced the judiciary she encountered "plagued by corruption,
improper influence and partiality.").
102. See Mary A. Ang'awa, A View From Kenya, Hum. Rts., Winter 2009,
at 23 (where Kenyan High Court judge reports being transferred to distant
outpost after supporting judicial independence reforms); see also Matthews, supra
note 98, at 568 (discussing how the executive dismissed nearly half the judiciary
in an anti-corruption campaign, including the transfer of two judges to posts 200
kilometers away for ruling against the executive's interests).
103. See Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report 2009 -
Kenya, http://thereport.amnesty.org/en/regions/africa/kenya (last visited Oct. 14,
2009).
104. Joshua N. Auerbach, Police Accountability in Kenya, 3 Afr. Hum. Rts.
L.J. 275, 277 (2003).
105. U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 84.
106. Auerbach, supra note 104, at 292. However, there have been some
very recent uses of the civil court system by alleged victims of Kenyan police
misconduct to pursue complaints of unlawful arrest and harassment. See Eunice
Machuci, High Court Directs Over Case on Police Conduct, Daily Nation, July 7,
2009, available at http://allafrica.com/stories/200907070827.html; see also Frame
of Suit Act, (1975) Cap. 21 § 2. (Kenya) (demonstrating that there exists the
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Indigent criminal defendants are not appointed counsel
unless they are accused of a capital crime. °7 But those few
defendants who can afford counsel are often acquitted because the
police, not attorneys, handle most of the court prosecution duties,'0 8
leading to a potential sense of impunity for the few defendants with
resources or connections allowing them to "beat" the dysfunctional
criminal justice system.'0 9 Kenya's prisons are violent, overcrowded,
and the site of unchallenged police torture. 1o
The Kenyan court system also suffers from enormous case
backlogs,"' with as many as one million cases pending in 2008 and
300,000 sitting before Nairobi's high court alone."12 The clogged court
system means that many Kenyan criminal defendants wait in those
prisons for years before receiving a trial.' The civil courts are also
generally off-limits to the poor, who cannot afford either filing fees"'
or hired counsel.' The financial bar to formal courts leaves most
potential under Kenyan law for such claims to be joined in a class action suit
asking for broad remedies).
107. See Alloys Omondi Nanga v. Republic of Kenya, at 5 (C.A.K. Nov. 24,
2006), http://docs.thecourt.ca/top-court talk/omondi.pdf (noting that although
Kenyan law does not specifically require appointment of counsel to indigent
defendants in any case, it is custom in Kenyan courts to appoint such counsel to
defendants accused of murder).
108. Chopra, supra note 99, at 15.
109. Those who enjoy the freedom that comes with an ineffectual criminal
justice system include government ministers. A poignant example in the early
1990s, known as the Goldenberg scandal, involved government funds given for
fictitious gold exports and cost Kenya as much as 10% of its gross domestic
product. Investigations implicated government officials up to and including
President Daniel arap Moi. Yet no top official has been convicted of any crime.
See, e.g., Michaela Wong, It's Our Turn to Eat 322 (2009) ("The culprits are likely
to spend the rest of their lives being driven around by chauffeurs, relaxing in
Nairobi's wood-paneled clubs and strolling the lush fairways of its golf clubs.").
110. U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 84.
111. Id.
112. Comm'n on Legal Empowerment of the Poor, supra note 6, at 32.
113. Robert Winslow, Crime and Society - Kenya, http://www.rohan.sd
su.edu/faculty/rwinslow/africa/kenya.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2009).
114. See Chopra, supra note 99, at 12 (filing fees are usually about 700
Kenyan shillings, about $12 U.S.) (explaining that filing fees of 700 Kenyan
shillings, or about $12 U.S., make it particularly difficult for poorer social groups
to make use of the courts).
115. Kalla & Cohen, supra note 85, at 22, 24. It should be noted that the
United States, whose judicial system is often held up as a model for developing
countries to emulate, also largely fails to ensure counsel for the poor in civil legal
matters, see, e.g., Debra Gardner, Justice Delayed Is, Once Again, Justice Denied:
The Overdue Right To Counsel In Civil Cases, 37 U. Balt. L. Rev. 59, 70 - 71
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aggrieved parties with no alternative but the customary system,
Islamic courts, or appeals to chiefs or elders. While these forums can
often produce just results, cultural biases against the rights of
women, for example, can make them an inadequate substitute for
formal adjudication.'
16
3. Corruption in the 2007 Election
Beyond the justice system, broader evidence of a missing rule
of law was provided by the 2007 Kenyan presidential election, which
non-partisan domestic"17 and international 1 8  election observers
concluded was stolen by the incumbent Mwai Kibaki." 9 Widespread
ethnic and political violence followed the announcement of the
disputed result, and over 1,000 people were killed and 500,000
(2007) (arguing that the presence of counsel in civil cases is crucial to a fair
outcome and is unattainable without substantial funds). The U.S. also has
significant problems assuring competent counsel to indigent criminal defendants,
see, e.g., Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal
Cases, A National Crisis, 57 Hastings L.J. 1031, 1034 (2006) (demonstrating how
the system doesn't function well by offering examples of ineffective counsel as
well as statistics that show poor people account for more than 80% of individuals
prosecuted, that these criminal defendants plead guilty approximately 90% of the
time, and of these cases, more than half the lawyers entered pleas for their
clients without spending any significant time on the cases, without interviewing
witnesses, or filing motions). Further, the U.S. is criticized for an over-politicized
judiciary, see Upham supra note 54, at 32, and for adopting a post-September 11,
2001 "monarchical" presidential model.
116. See, e.g., Kenneth K. Mwenda et al., Property-Grabbing Under African
Customary Law: Repugnant to Natural Justice, Equity, and Good Conscience, Yet
A Troubling Reality, 37 Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev 949, 951-52 (2005) ("The
Zambian legal system integrates both African and European legal procedures.
While the Zambian Constitution declares gender discrimination illegal, it also
holds an exception for matters usually handled by customary law."). But see
Chopra, supra note 87, at 3 (reporting a successful attempt to change the tribal
Luo culture by engaging community leaders); World Bank, supra note 89 (arguing
that these forums can improve their respect for gender equity).
117. Kenyans for Peace and Truth with Justice, Kenyan Election
Observers' Log, Dec. 29-30, 2007 (2008), available at
ftp://ftp.wizzy.com/pub/wizzy/kenyalKPTJelectionobs.pdf.
118. See Jeffrey Gettleman, Disputed Vote Plunges Kenya Into Bloodshed,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 2007, at Al.
119. After the election, a joke which circulated in Kenya was based on the
premise that the incumbent President and three others went into a room and all
cast secret ballots to choose the next president, with the results to be tallied by
the Election Commission appointed by the president. Who won this election, as
the joke would have it? The incumbent president, by 11 votes.
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persons were internally displaced. 120 As Kenyan High Court Judge
Mary A. Ang'awa wrote, the lack of faith in the justice system played
a large role in the descent into chaos:
When the results were announced, the losers felt cheated
and were angry. When they were told, "If you are not
satisfied with the election results, go to court and challenge
them," they responded, "We have no confidence in the
judiciary; we refuse to go to court."
As a judicial officer of twenty-seven years at that time,
fourteen on the High Court of Kenya, this remark cut me to
the core. Instead of organized and rational legal
intervention, violence broke out and the country burned.'
Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and other
human rights organizations found significant evidence that much of
the post-election violence was coordinated and supported by political
actors, but no high-level leaders have been either arrested or
prosecuted. 122 The post-election violence followed a pattern of attack
by one group and then retaliation by another, which is not an
unfamiliar sequence in Kenya. 2 3 Human rights observers blame this
pattern of retribution, and the country's history of mob attacks and
violence connected to land disputes and alleged criminal behavior, on
a prevailing lack of confidence in the Kenyan criminal justice
system's ability to bring perpetrators to justice. 24 These ground-level
conclusions are consistent with the findings by William Easterly that
countries are at a greater risk of ethnic conflict if their governments
120. See Human Rights Watch, From Ballots to Bullets 24-35 (2008),
available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/kenya0308web.pdf (a
detailed account of the Kenyan 2007 election and post-election violence, and the
involvement of political leaders in causing and stoking the turmoil).
121. Ang'awa, supra note 102, at 23.
122. Human Rights Watch, supra note 120, at 20.
123. Id. at 17-20, 42-55.
124. See U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 84. A recent survey showed that in
rural Kenya, only 7% of the population says it reports disputes to the police, with
the vast majority preferring instead to bring their complaints to chiefs, elders, or
other informal venues. Chopra, supra note 99, at 11 ("People do not necessarily
see the official system as the best place to sort out their grievances. One of the
foremost reasons for this is that local communities have different ideas of what is
'just' and how conflicts ought to be resolved."). However, chiefs themselves are
civil servants in Kenya and are empowered under law to maintain order in their
jurisdictions. The Chiefs Authority Act, (1997) Cap. 128 § 6. (Kenya).
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cannot or do not enforce rule of law concepts like protection of
minorities and property rights.'2 5
IV. THE WIDESPREAD FAILURE OF EFFORTS TO DEVELOP RULE OF
LAW
As shown above, the international community has responded
to the absence of rule of law and human rights in Kenya and other
developing countries with significant investments in rule of law
programming as part of an overall development approach. However,
these rule of law efforts have been largely ineffective. This failure is
the result of adherence to a misguided model of top-down efforts to
impose rule of law on countries without adequate attention to the
necessary task of growing grassroots-level political will for
enforcement of basic human rights.
A. The "Top-Down" Approach to Rule of Law Programming
Rule of law programming has been largely designed as a "top-
down" approach to achieving legal reform, with the focus of
intervention on state institutions and the elites of the justice system.
The World Bank Vice President has formally announced that since
"judges are the key to an effective and efficient legal system, the
Bank's activities concentrate on judicial training; judicial codes of
conduct; evaluation and discipline; qualification, appointment and
promotion of judges."1 6 The practical application of this strategy is
that rule of law spending largely revolves around intervention with
the judiciary and other elite-level government actors. 127 In
development discussions, the term "law reform" is sometimes even
literally equated with "judicial reform."
128
The manifestation of this judiciary-centered approach is
found in the significant expenditures on courthouse structures,
equipment, judge training, and international judicial exchanges, with
markedly smaller amounts set aside for grassroots interventions.
125. William Easterly, Can Institutions Resolve Ethnic Conflict? 16 (World
Bank, Policy Research Working Paper Series No. 2482, 2000).
126. The World Bank, Legal and Judicial Reform, supra note 16 at 5.
127. See Daniels & Trebilock, supra note 54, at 119; see also Carothers,
supra note 56, at 8 (noting the focus on judiciaries in rule of law promotion); see
Trubek, supra note 22, at 86 (arguing that rule of law projects place "special
emphasis" on issues relating to the judiciary).
128. Carothers, supra note 56, at 8; see also Jensen, supra note 30, at 345
(discussing a "standard package of judicial reforms" in rule of law initiatives).
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World Bank staff admits that part of the allure of investing in court
buildings and equipment is that they are expensive, and therefore
help achieve the bizarre-but-true priority for Bank personnel: ensure
that money is spent. "Disbursements are a primary indicator of a
project's progress," writes Linn Hammergren, senior public sector
management specialist in the World Bank Latin America Regional
Department, and as such, "[tihe task manager's main concern ... is
to keep the money flowing." 29 For example, a nearly $70 million law
reform project in Guatemala, funded by the World Bank, USAID, and
the European Union, among others, was dominated by court
construction and judicial training. 30 The Bank evaluated the results
of its investment as "moderately unsatisfactory," using its official
project completion report to candidly acknowledge the limited
efficacy of money spent on buildings and seminars. The report stated:
Although so obvious as to hardly bear mention, without
counterpart buy-in, a judicial or institutional reform effort
will not get far. It is the corollary to this statement that is
more important: buy-in means not just accepting the donor
contributions, but rather internalizing and actively
pursuing the change goals behind them.131
One explanation provided for the dominance of this
exceedingly formal, elite-focused approach to law reform is that rule
of law programs are largely designed by lawyers from the global
North, who have been criticized for a lack of background in the field
of development. 32 It appears these lawyers have been comfortable
with the strategy of implanting a global North-style legal system
onto another culture, and have preferred to pursue that strategy via
court construction projects and convening meetings and seminars
with elite judicial officers and government leaders.1
33
129. Hammergren, supra note 55, at 314; see also Jensen, supra note 30, at
350-51 (multilateral development banks seek investments that can absorb large
amounts of capital unconcerned with effectiveness of investments).
130. World Bank, Implementation and Completion Report on a Loan of
U.S. $33 Million to the Republic of Guatemala for a Judicial Reform Project 4-5
(2008). However, the report does note that USAID interventions in Guatemala,
including 24-hour courts to address arrestee backlog, were successful. Id. at 43.
131. Id. at 42.
132. See Samuels, supra note 26, at 21; see also Thomas J. McInerney, Law
and Development as Democratic Practice, 38 Vand. J. Transact'l. L. 109, 117-18
(highlighting the fact that the high number of lawyers working in rule of law
reform results in a focus on legal questions).
133. See generally Barron, supra note 48, at 8 (listing insufficient
knowledge of local culture, hostility to foreigners, and excessive costs as issues
faced by foreign lawyers); Carothers, supra note 56, at 12-13 (discussing the
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Rule of law assistance strategies often include support for
direct legal services and funding for civil society advocates for legal
rights, usually bundled under the heading of "access to justice"
programming. But those investments are characterized by critics like
Erick Jensen as "lip service interventions [that] always find their
way into donor reports, but they receive very little if any MDB
[multilateral development bank] funding .... Activities related to
access to justice for disadvantaged sectors-women, the poor, lower
castes-are always a part of the standard package, but more often
than not, the very last part."134 The World Bank appears poised to
prove Jensen correct yet again in a forthcoming 2009 $40 million
loan to Kenya, which the Bank and Kenya's Chief Justice report will
be focused on judicial administration, training and
computerization. 
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V. THE FAILURE OF RULE OF LAW PROGRAMMING
Most observers have concluded that the recent decades' rule
of law efforts have been largely ineffective in achieving either
meaningful legal reform or significant economic development, 136 and
major obstacles faced by foreign lawyers promoting rule of law in the last 30
years).
134. Jensen, supra note 30, at 350; see also Stephen Golub, Beyond Rule of
Law Orthodoxy 5 (Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace, Democracy and Rule of
Law Project, Carnegie Papers No. 41, 2003), available at
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/wp41.pdf (explaining that, while banks
undertake some innovative civil society initiatives, these often pale in comparison
to the number of more orthodox initiatives); Jeremy Perelman, Beyond Common
Knowledge: Empirical Approaches to the Rule of Law, 47 Harv. Int'l L.J. 531, 534
(2006) (book review) (arguing that rule of law practices remain unchanged
despite attempts to focus on poverty eradiation).
135. World Bank, Strong World Bank Support for Anti-Corruption Efforts
in Kenya (2008), www.worldbank.org (follow "Topics" hyperlink; follow "Law and
Development" hyperlink; follow "News and Events" hyperlink; follow "News"
hyperlink); see also Claire Wanja, Kenya Broadcasting Corporation, WB to Fund
Establishment of Judicial Training Institute (Dec. 7, 2007),
http://www.kbc.co.ke/story.asp?ID=46934 (reporting that the institute is intended
to "equip judicial officers with new and emerging branches of law and new
methods of judicial adjudication").
136. See, e.g., Carothers, supra note 7, at 104-05 (arguing that the positive
effects of rule of law have been exaggerated); Carothers, supra note 56, at 8-9
(discussing the lack of knowledge on the essence of rule of law and how it
develops); Brooks, supra note 51, at 2276-2340 (undermining the belief that rule
of law decreases violence); Goodpaster, supra note 56, at 660 (arguing that legal
reforms are "difficult to implement," corrupt, or unable to fully provide what they
promise); Samuels, supra note 26, at 18 (arguing that less formal means are less
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the prevailing judiciary-centered approach has earned particular
criticism:
A limiting and unsuccessful emphasis on "form" rather than
"function" seems to have dominated much of the rule of law
reform over the years. Programs have typically focused on
institutional objectives and formal legal structures without
a measured understanding of the political and economic
dynamics that prevented such structures from existing in
the first place .... The focus on formal institutions has
largely resulted in shell-like institutions, unenforced and
poorly understood legislation, and judges and police with
little commitment to the rights and values sought to be
entrenched through the reform.
137
expensive and more efficient); Kaufman, supra note 54, at 10 (providing evidence
that there is little progress worldwide in improving rule of law); Stephen Holmes,
Can Foreign Aid Promote the Rule of Law?, 8 E. Eur. Const. Rev. 68, 69 (1999)
(focusing on ineffective efforts to promote rule of law in the Russian Federation);
McInerney, supra note 132, at 110 (research indicates that efforts to promote rule
of law and good governance have not improved either). But see Hammergren,
supra note 55, at 296-298, (defending the efficacy of some USAID rule of law
programming). Unfortunately, in the area of development programming, rule of
law efforts have plenty of company in the category of unproven interventions.
Development assistance on the whole has its vociferous supporters, see Jeffrey
Sachs, The End of Poverty (2005) (arguing that the US currently spends far too
little on development assistance), and equally passionate detractors, see William
Easterly, White Man's Burden (2006) (claiming that development assistance has
traditionally been misguided and consistently failed to meet goals), but even
many development scholars who see the value of development programming
concede that decades of effort and billions of dollars in investment have had little
proven success to date. See generally Paul Clements, Monitoring and Evaluation
for Cost-Effectiveness in Development Management, 2 J. MultiDisciplinary
Evaluation 11, 11-24 (2005) (discussing the lack of accountability in development
assistance); Paul Collier, The Bottom Billion (2007) (discussing broadly why
international aid has not resulted in measurable improvement in developing
nations).
137. Samuels, supra note 26, at 17-18; see also Carothers, supra note 56,
at 8 (noting that "it is by no means clear that courts are the essence of a rule-of-
law system in a country .... Yet for the last ten to fifteen years, rule-of-law
programs have given dominant attention to judiciaries, without much
examination of whether such a focus is really the right one."); Daniels &
Trebilock, supra note 54, at 119 (discussing the focus on formal policing as an
aspect of rule of law); Golub, supra note 134, at 61 ("the concept of justice
represents a broader and more effective organizing principle than the rule of
law"); Maria Dakolias, Legal and Judicial Development: The Role of Civil Society
in the Reform Process, 24 Fordham Int'l L.J. S26, S30 (2000-2001) (arguing that
judicial reforms may only provide temporary solutions).
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Another commentator, Frank Upham, compared the top-
down rule of law approach to the Soviet Union's failed economic
model and bluntly pronounced the record of law reform as "dismal."
138
Indeed, empirical evaluations of judiciary-centered reforms have not
shown significant positive effects on availability or efficiency of
justice. 139 Analyses of rule of law efforts in Latin America have shown
that most programs there have had neither indirect effects on
economic development nor significant direct impact on the law as it
applies to the people. 140 The U.S. General Accounting Office
concluded that the U.S.'s extensive rule of law investments in the
former Soviet Union were largely ineffective, 41 a conclusion also
reached regarding rule of law efforts in Kosovo.142 Karen Bravo
labeled the adoption of new laws, a new constitution, and the
ratification of human rights treaties in Armenia-reforms
generously supported by bilateral and multilateral aid and loans-as
"smoke and mirrors" designed to hide corrupt elections and an
increasingly autocratic system of government. 143
A defining characteristic of this formalistic approach to rule
of law programming is its reliance on "transplants" of legal systems
characteristic of the global North into developing countries, despite
the well-chronicled failure during the 1960s law and development era
of this approach. 1" Efforts to transplant a theoretically high-
138. See Upham, supra note 54, at 6.
139. Jensen, supra note 30, at 358-59.
140. Prillaman, supra note 62, at 163-65; see also Linn Hammergren,
UNDP, Fifteen Years of Judicial Reform in Latin America 7 (1999) ("[Tihe
traditional, institutionalized remedies-new laws, higher budgets, more courts,
or massive judicial purges-have not worked any miracles and occasionally have
made things worse.").
141. U.S. General Accounting Office, Former Soviet Union: U.S. Rule of
Law Assistance Has Had Limited Impact and Sustainability (2001). See also
Holmes, supra note 136, at 70 (explaining that the incoherent Russian state
tenuously connected to a demoralized society is the reason for little rule of law
despite foreign efforts to promote it); Bravo, supra note 115, at 489 (claiming that
since 1991 rule of law reform in Armenia has been largely superficial and
formalistic).
142. Brooks, supra note 51, at 2280, 2290-2301.
143. Bravo, supra note 115, at 499, 517.
144. Trubek, supra note 22, at 84-86 (discussion of failed "transplant"
strategy during law and development era); see also Daniel Berkowitz et al.,
Economic Development, Legality and the Transplant Effect, 47 Eur. Econ. Rev.
165, 181-86 (2003) (offering quantitative analysis showing significantly lower
levels in indicators for rule of law in countries where unfamiliar law was
transplanted compared to countries that adapted legal systems that more closely
resembled customary law). The belief that the legal systems of the West could
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functioning legal system into new postcolonial countries were and are
mistakes of both hubris 45 and strategy. 46 Thomas McInerney is
among many observers who argue that the countries' own indigenous
civil society leadership-which in most cases helped lead the struggle
for independence-needed to be supported in their own efforts to
grow and apply their own systems of justice. "[I]nclusive and
deliberate legal reform is the sine qua non for the creation of
legitimate law and democracy," McInerney writes. 47 "The democratic
process itself is necessary to determine the content of rights."
148
But rule of law funders have candidly admitted that their
reform efforts have been regularly launched without the involvement
of the non-elite public that the legal systems were designed to
serve. 149 Unsurprisingly, this top-down, ethnocentric approach to rule
of law reform has not effectively engaged customary forms of dispute
resolution by non-state actors like tribal councils, which are the
forum for as much as 80% of cases in developing countries 50 and are
sometimes quite effective at resolving disputes."'
Economists like de Soto15 2 and Douglass North' 53 long ago
identified the central role that the informal economy plays in the
and should be simply replicated in the developing world can trace its origins at
least as far back as Montesquieu, who concluded that "the intelligent world also
has its laws that by nature are invariable." Charles de Secondat Montesqieu, The
Spirit of the Laws 4 (Anne Cohler ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989) (1750).
145. See supra note 115 for discussion of the many ways in which
purportedly model legal systems like the American system fail to measure up to
rule of law ideals.
146. See, e.g., Comm'n on Legal Empowerment of the Poor, supra note 6, at
3 ("Reforms that are imposed, no matter how well-intended, rarely take root in
society. To be recognized as relevant and legitimate by a broad majority of people,
laws must be anchored in existing values, customs and structures, and also be
consistent with human rights obligations.").
147. McInerney, supra note 132, at 124.
148. Id. at 127.
149. Linn Hammergen, USAID, Political Will, Constituency Building and
Public Support for Rule of Law Programs 4 (1998).
150. Department for International Development, Safety, Security and
Accessible Justice 58 (2002).
151. See Widner, supra note 64, at 66; see also Samuels, supra note 26, at
18-19 (arguing that tradition, informal procedures should be considered in rule of
law programming because they are more effective and less costly). But see
Mwenda et al., supra note 116, at 950 (finding that customary African law is
often used to deprive widows from owning property); Ayuko & Chopra, supra note
79, at 40 (arguing that such forums can apply entrenched biases against the
rights of women).
152. See de Soto, supra note 37, at 153.
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lives of the world's poor. The formal approach to rule of law is not
well-suited to address this critical sector.
154
VI. THE ABSENCE OF POLITICAL WILL FOR LAW REFORM
Rule of law scholarship reveals a remarkable degree of
consensus that the recent decades' interventions have largely failed.
This scholarship also contains a remarkable degree of consensus as
to the reason for the failure. The concluding diagnosis has been the
inability to achieve the "political will" that supports human rights,
transparency, and the predictability of justice. United Nations
leadership,' 5  Western law professors,1 56 African grassroots legal
activists,157 economists, 158 USAID,159 and the World Bank itself'
6
specifically identify political will as the chief barrier to achieving rule
of law in developing countries.16 Even when the terminology varies,
the conclusion is the same: The World Bank has conceded that social
and political reform is needed to achieve law reforms,162 while some
153. See Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and
Economic Performance 67 (1990).
154. See Comm'n on Legal Empowerment of the Poor, supra note 6, at
17-19.
155. See Comm'n on Legal Empowerment of the Poor, supra note 60, at 5.
156. See, e.g., Goodpaster, supra note 56, at 688 (arguing that even a
remarkable system-wide law reform achievement may do little to affect rule of
law without political will to make it meaningful).
157. See Comm'n on Legal Empowerment of the Poor, supra note 60, at 6.
158. See de Soto, supra note 37, at 158-59 ("Implementing major legal
change is a political responsibility... creating an integrated system is not about
drafting laws and regulations that look good on paper but rather about designing
norms that are rooted in people's beliefs and are thus more likely to be obeyed
and enforced.").
159. See Hammergren, supra note 55, at 297.
160. See Barron, supra note 48, at 29.
161. Hammergren argues that the ubiquitous references to political will in
law reform discussions do not indicate an agreed-upon meaning for the term. See
Hammergren, supra note 149, at 12 ("[Political will] is the slipperiest concept in
the policy lexicon. It is the sine qua non of policy success which is never defined
except by its absence."). I disagree. In the rule of law context, the term seems to
be used in a fairly uniform context to mean the existence of empowered
institutions or individuals, whether motivated by their own initiative or by
outside pressure, committed to the principle that law restricts the state's
autonomy and delivers a responsibility for transparency, accountability, and the
protection of equity and human rights.
162. See, e.g., World Bank, Engendering Development 140-44 (2001)
(arguing that legal reform alone cannot bring about true gender equality as social
and political norms also have a drastic impact on the role of sexes in society).
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rule of law commentators refer to the need for "cultural change' 63 or
"deep societal changes,"' and recognize that human rights
guarantees are more dependent on political factors than on legal
ones.'
65
The widespread frustration over the inability to achieve
political will for reform reveals the limitations of the legal and
economic theories upon which law reform efforts are based.
Carothers says, with substantial justification, that "rule of law
proponents are short on knowledge on how rule of law develops in
societies and how such development can be stimulated beyond
simplistic efforts to copy institutional norms."'66 Carothers goes on to
articulate more clearly the unknowns within the rule of law
movement:
Clearly law is not just the sum of courts, legislatures,
police, prosecutors, and other formal institutions with some
direct connection to law. Law is also a normative system
that resides in the minds of the citizens of a society ....
Major questions abound, still unanswered. For example,
how does the will to reform develop? Can it be generated
and if so how? Should we assume that institutions change
through gradualist reform processes willed by persons
inside the system? Does public pressure play a major role?
What about abrupt, drastic change provoked by persons
outside the institutions who are dissatisfied with their
function or who have their own goals about what
institutions are to have?'
67
Carothers is undoubtedly correct that most rule of law
promoters seem unaware of how these developments occur. But this
does not mean that the questions he poses have not been studied and
analyzed. In fact, the examination of how this kind of social and
political change occurs is the very heart of the sociological study of
163. See, e.g., Dakolias, supra note 137, at S27 (stating that legal and
judicial reform need time to take effect, as reform requires both a cultural change
and a systemic change in the delivery of justice); Kleinfeld Belton, supra note 15,
at 21 (noting that widespread institutional legal reform is not enough without
cultural change, as recalcitrant cultures or balking politicians can undermine
well organized rule of law institutions).
164. Samuels, supra note 26, at 19.
165. See Viljoen & Louw, supra note 66, at 32-33.
166. Thomas Carothers argues that anthropologists and sociologists,
among others, have much to offer in the evaluation of how to influence rule of law
norms. See Carothers, supra note 56, at 23-25.
167. Id. at 8, 10.
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social movements. The analysis of social movements would have
predicted the failure of recent decades' top-down efforts to inculcate
the political will for meaningful law reform. And social movement
research provides guidance on how to pursue these important goals
much more effectively going forward.
VII. GROWING POLITICAL WILL FOR LAW REFORM: APPLYING THE
LESSONS OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
A. Introduction-A Social Movement Agenda
Most scholarly analyses of rule of law efforts, and agency-
sponsored reporting of their shortcomings, run up against the barrier
posed by the absence of political will for law reform, and then come to
an exasperated halt.1 68 It is time to scale that barrier, and to do so by
integrating lessons from the study of social movements to the process
of designing effective methods to promote the rule of law and human
rights.
For several decades, social scientists have analyzed the
dynamics of social change, with a special emphasis on the
movements that were able to achieve the change they sought. Studies
of efforts like the U.S. civil rights movement of the mid-twentieth
century, 69 the Indian independence movement, 70 the South African
anti-apartheid movement,'' democracy movements in Russia 7 2 and
168. See, e.g., Brooks, supra note 51, at 2326 (noting, as Carothers does,
that anthropologists, sociologists and others have much to offer in the evaluation
of how to influence rule of law norms).
169. See, e.g., Lewis M. Killian, Organization, Rationality and Spontaneity
in the Civil Rights Movement, 49 Am. Soc. Rev. 770, 782 (1984) ("It is concluded
that while organization and planning are key variables, social movement theory
must take into account spontaneity and emergence, and the transformation of
pre-existing structures.").
170. See, e.g., Charles Tilly, Social Movements, 1768-2004, at 90-92 (2004)
(discussing the nationalistic Indian social movements against British rule led by
Mohandas Gandhi).
171. See, e.g., HAkan Thorn, Anti-Apartheid and the Emergence of a Global
Civil Society (2006) (analyzing the anti-apartheid movement from a comparative,
historical and sociological perspective while highlighting the role of media and
civil society in the context of the movement).
172. See, e.g., Elena Zdravomyslova, Opportunities and Framing in the
Transition to Democracy: The Case for Russia, in Comparative Perspectives on
Social Movements 122, 122-37 (Doug McAdam et al. eds., 1996) (analyzing
symbolic framing in Russia to show changes in political opportunities over a
transitional period).
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Eastern Europe, 7 3 and the women's empowerment movement in
Chile 17 4 have revealed the existence of what social movement
theorists Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly call a
"classical social movement agenda" that includes:
" Political opportunities for challengers to engage in successful
collective action;
" Forms of organization allowing mobilization;
" Framing of grievances to dignify claims, connect them to other
claims, and help produce a collective identity among
claimants; and
" Repertoires of contention, or the means by which people engage
in collective action.
1 75
This Article employs these four components of the classical
social movement agenda as the structure to assess the overall
climate for growing political will in support of rule of law. Of course,
it is impossible to review every developing country for its readiness to
serve as a host of a rule of law movement, and there is no one-size-
fits-all blueprint for such a movement. But this discussion reveals
both the current opportunity for dramatic change and a clear path to
guide rule of law promoters toward a more effective approach.
The components of a social movement agenda reflect the
resolution of a long-standing debate among social movement scholars
over the relative importance of the psychological state of movement
actors vis-a-vis structural conditions inside and outside the
movement. The "classical collective behavior" theory, which held that
social movements come about because of spontaneous behavior of
aggrieved parties responding to increased discontent, was the
dominant U.S. perspective until the 1970s. 7 6 Then, the "resource
173. See, e.g., John K. Glenn, III, Framing Democracy (2001) (offering a
critique of existing theories of democracy by explaining different paths of
democracy within Eastern Europe).
174. See, e.g., Rita K Noonan, Women Against the State: Political
Opportunities and Collective Action Forces in Chile's Transition to Democracy, 10
Soc. F. 81, 94 (1995) (discussing the use of "mother's centers" under the Allende
government in the early 1970s that gave women a core of material and ideological
resources, creating a collective action frame for subsequent mobilizations).
175. Doug McAdam et al., Dynamics of Contention 41 (2001).
176. See, e.g., Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel 234, 277 (1970) (likelihood
of collective violence depends on the extent to which societies rely on coercion to
maintain order, and is less likely to occur when discontented people have
constructive means to achieve their goals).
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mobilization" theory, holding that social movements derive from
more rational and strategic action constrained by external societal
forces like governments or elites, proved to be more robust under
quantitative analysis.
77
Now, the most credible observers of social movements find a
combination of these psychological and structural factors to be
present in movement genesis. For example, Lewis Killian, in his
study of the Tallahassee, Florida civil rights movement, found that
key roles were played by both impromptu passionate marches and
existing student, church, and NAACP (National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People) organizations. Killian concluded:
New developments in theory have reminded us that
organization, resources and planning are essential to the
success of a social movement and should not be neglected in
practice or research .... [But] social movement theory
must take into account spontaneity and emergence and the
forces which generate them.
178
In recognition of the fact that political scientists and historians
engage in their own analyses of the forces that cause societal
changes, McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly have begun the process of a
broad theory synthesis by connecting the segregated studies of social
movements, revolutions, democratization, and other such phenomena
into an inclusive area of study they call "contentious politics." 7 9
The important lesson that social movement studies provide
for rule of law promoters is that there are clear differences between
the structures of movements that have successfully created the
"political will" for change and their own failed efforts to establish
support for rule of law and human rights in developing countries.
And it is not too late to change course and achieve significant results
177. See John McCarthy & Mayer Zald, Resource Mobilization and Social
Movements: A Partial Theory, 82 Am. J. Soc. 1212, 1213 (1977); see also Jo
Freeman, Resource Mobilization and Strategy: A Model for Analyzing Social
Movement Organization Actions, in The Dynamics of Social Movements 167, 167-
89 (John McCarthy & Mayer Zald eds., 1979) (a movement's success rate depends
on the boundaries within which a movement's strategy develops, the resources a
movement can mobilize, the limits on the use of these resources, and the
environment that molds the possibilities for effective action).
178. Killian, supra note 169, at 782.
179. See McAdam et al., supra note 175, at 5 ("By contentious politics we
mean: episodic, public, collective interaction among makers of claims ... when (a)
at least one government is a claimant, an object of claims, or a party to the claims
and (b) the claims would, if realized, affect the interests of at least one of the
claimants.").
2009] POLITICAL WILL FROM THE GRASSROOTS 47
for the benefit of Leah J. and others similarly situated. With respect
to rule of law and human rights, the core elements of the classical
social movement agenda appear to exist in much of the developing
world right now, including the settings that have proven to be the
most inhospitable to prevailing top-down methods to promote rule of
law. A significant historical opportunity for real reform is at hand,
especially if rule of law promoters can re-orient their approach to
support the grassroots advocates who can deliver the political will
that has proven so elusive to date.
B. Political Opportunities for Challengers to Engage in
Successful Collective Action
1. An Atmosphere Ripe For Change
In analyzing the first element of the classical social
movement agenda, it is clear that external factors like population
growth, governmental policies, funding availability, and the presence
or absence of elite allies impact political opportunity, and thus the
formation and relative success of social movements.18 ° But, to some
extent, movement actors can also create their own political
opportunity by "framing"-a process which will be discussed in more
detail below-the current moment as ripe for dramatic action for law
reform and human rights, i.e. "right here, right now, we have a
chance to make history."'81 Such framing needs empirical validity in
order to endure, but there is evidence to support that rhetoric of
opportunity in many parts of the early twenty-first century
developing world.
The nations in question are, for the most part, young
democracies that may be poised to follow the rights development
trends of more mature democracies, most of which have seen
180. See, e.g., David S. Meyer & Debra C. Minkoff, Conceptualizing
Political Opportunity, 82 Soc. Forces 1457, 1476-80 (2004) (demonstrating that
issue-specific and general political conditions are relevant predictors of social
movement organization founding rates and that a movement's success depends on
legislative developments and elite support for the movement's objectives).
181. William A. Gamson & David S. Meyer, Framing Political Opportunity,
in Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements, supra note 172, at 275, 276;
see also Charles Kurzman, Structural Opportunity and Perceived Opportunity in
Social Movement Theory: The Iranian Revolution of 1979, 61 Am. Soc. Rev. 153,
154-56 (1996) (Iranians assessed a positive opportunity for protest based on the
strength of the opposition movement, rather than on a perceived structural
weakness of the state).
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successful struggles for property rights, the rights of women and
marginalized minorities, overcoming barriers like official
corruption."2 De Soto in particular draws parallels between the
struggle for property rights in the current developing world and the
fits and starts of the nineteenth century progress toward defining
similar rights in the United States.8 3 Social scientists at least as far
back as Gunnar Myrdal18 4 and T.H. Marshall 18 5 in the mid-twentieth
century identified trends, if not universal patterns, of rights
evolution in democratic societies. Evidence to support the notion of
an increasing receptivity to the rule of law in developing nations
comes from data showing a recent surge in the use of courts in
Botswana, Uganda, and Tanzania, and a corresponding willingness
of heads of state in those countries to grant increased autonomy to
the judiciaries. 86 These examples are significant, given the historical
tendency of people in developing countries to mistrust the
impartiality and effectiveness of the formal judicial system.' 7
VIII. SELF-IMPOSED EXPECTATIONS BY LOCAL ELITES
The trend of an increasing expectation of justice is also
consistent with social movement research findings that government
182. See, e.g., Bravo, supra note 115, at 579-580 (arguing that democratic
transition in Armenia will be strengthened by organic domestic developments,
similar to the way American democracy emerged from a period of darkness to
increased personal rights through fundamental Constitutional amendments). For
purposes of this social movement discussion, I am referring to countries not
immediately emerging from conflict. However, it should be noted that those
countries, although likely less ripe in terms of organizations ready to assume the
call for reform, are also existing in moments of civic fluidity providing political
opportunity for change. For a review of lessons drawn from rule of law programs
in post-conflict and fragile countries, see Samuels, supra note 26, at 15-23.
183. De Soto, supra note 37, at 105-51.
184. Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and
Modern Democracy 998-1004 (1944).
185. Thomas H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class and Other Essays
10-14 (1950). But see Guillermo O'Donnell, Reflections on Contemporary South
American Democracies, 33 J. Latin Am. Stud. 599, 603-04 (arguing that the
Marshall pattern of rights development from civil and political rights into social
rights has not occurred in most of South America).
186. See Widner, supra note 64, at 72-73.
187. See Kleinfeld Belton, supra note 15, at 10; see also Comm'n on Legal
Empowerment of the Poor, supra note 60, at 34 (explaining that the majority of
people see the judicial system as a viable means for solving disputes); see also
Bravo, supra note 115, at 561 (noting that Armenians respond to corruption in
government by general disregard of the rule of law).
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support for reform, even if it is a non-binding expression of support,
will increase the opportunities for a social movement demanding that
the government's rhetoric of reform be matched by its actions. 88 As
noted in Parts II and III above, there is no shortage of official
recognition of the value of rights protection in developing countries,
expressed in treaty signings and favorable language in constitutions
and statutes.189 Although the rhetoric has little or no immediate
effect in the legal protections available to citizens like Leah J., social
movement research suggests the near-empty promises may raise
popular expectations of justice, which in turn increase the prospects
for long-term reform.' 90 Leaders who claim the mantle of human
rights may soon be called upon by their citizens to practice what they
preach.
IX. TRANSNATIONAL SUPPORT
Further evidence of political opportunity for rights and law
advocacy comes in the guise of transnational civil society actors, who
now play a larger role in human rights promotion across the globe
than at any time in history.'9 ' In social movement parlance, groups
such as these whose goals are to help individuals outside their own
direct membership are known as "universalistic" 92 advocates. The
dramatic expansion of electronic communication enhances the
connection that universalistic actors like Human Rights Watch and
188. See Meyer & Minkoff, supra note 180, at 1475; see also J. Craig
Jenkins & Charles Perrow, Insurgency of the Powerless: Farm Worker Movements
(1946-1972), 42 Am. Soc. Rev. 249, 265 (1977) (arguing that there is a positive
correlation between federal government actions and increased social movement
influence).
189. For discussions of motivation for country leaders signing such treaties
in the first place, see, e.g., Stephen Krasner, Sovereignty 121-23 (1999)
(demonstrating that motives vary depending on the particular country and
historical context and that the range of motives include desire to constrain future
governments, to present the appearance of modernity, or to attract supporters in
other countries); Eric Posner, Op-Ed., What the Cold War Taught Us: Liberal
Democracies, Not Activists And International Law, Protect Human Rights, Wall.
St. J., Apr. 22, 2007, at A9 (demonstrating that as populations become wealthier
and more educated, they demand greater civil and political rights).
190. Meyer & Minkoff, supra note 180, at 1462-63, 1469-70, 1474-75.
191. See Julie Mertus, From Legal Transplants to Transformative Justice:
Human Rights and the Promise of Transnational Civil Society, 14 Am. U. Int'l L.
Rev. 1335, 1336 (1999); see also McCarthy & Zald, supra note 177, at 1225
(technological capacity recognized as a key resource for social movements well
before internet technology was widely available).
192. William A. Gamson, The Strategy of Social Protest 55 (1990).
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Amnesty International can have with the developing world. The flow
of information goes both ways: the transnational advocates share
information about successful rights advocacy with the aggrieved in
the developing world, and indigenous rights advocates relay back the
details of their plight to the universalistic advocates who can lend
their help to the cause. 93 One key capacity offered by transnational
civil society actors is attracting media attention, which can play a
vital role in forming and mobilizing a social movement. 194 The global
movement against apartheid in South Africa provides a notable
recent example of an effective transnational-local advocacy
partnership. 95 A lesser-known precedent can be found in Chilean
legal advocates' documentation of human rights abuses during the
1970s and 1980s. The information compiled by indigenous advocates
was used by transnational human rights groups to pressure the
Chilean government and obtain consistent United Nations
condemnation of the government's human rights record.' 96
In comparing successful social movements to the recent
clumsy efforts to instill rule of law, the most fundamental contrast is
found in the role of the elite. As discussed above, the strategies of
multilateral and bilateral investors in the rule of law have
concentrated on direct attempts to try to win the hearts and minds of
the judicial and political elite. Given that the current systems'
dysfunctional nature provides substantial benefits to those very
elites, more than one commentator has pointed out this strategy is
unlikely to succeed.' 97 Ironically, even though a key component of
political opportunity for rule of law movements is the existence of
sympathetic, motivated and deep-pocketed funders like the World
193. Noam Cohen, Twitter on the Barricades, N.Y. Times, June 20, 2009, at
WK4 (discussing the role of Twitter in disseminating information and organizing
mass protests in Iran and Moldova).
194. Meyer & Minkoff, supra note 180, at 1478.
195. See, e.g., Thorn, supra note 171, at 48-72 (discussing the globalization
of the anti-apartheid movement, and the significant role that national policy,
national organizations, and national political cultures played in shaping the anti-
apartheid struggle in different parts of the world).
196. Hugo Fruhling, From Dictatorship to Democracy, in Many Roads to
Justice 55, 61-81 (Mary McClymont & Stephen Golub eds., 2000).
197. See Kleinfeld Belton, supra note 15, at 9; see also Daniels & Trebilock,
supra note 54, at 129-130 (explaining the reluctance of high level officials to give
up their power and thereby the status quo is unlikely to change); Carothers,
supra note 56, at 8-9 (criticizing the focus on developing institutions, particularly
the judiciary, rather than instilling a respect for law amongst the citizenry). The
ill-fated "law and development" movement of the 1960s also focused on the
training of lawyers and judges. See Barron, supra note 48, at 6.
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Bank, investors' pay limited attention to indigenous service providers
and movement actors.19
8
Even though institutions such as the World Bank and USAID
are clearly elites themselves, and non-indigenous elites at that, there
is substantial precedent for them to play key roles in successful social
movements. The Indian independence movement,' 99 the South
African anti-apartheid movement.. and the U.S. farm worker
movement, 20 1 among many others, were all supported financially by
elite individuals and organizations.
In assessing the potential value provided by outside
supporters of social movements, the work of Craig Jenkins and
Charles Perrow on U.S. farm worker movements is particularly
instructive. In comparing the failed 1946-1952 attempt by the
national Farm Labor Union to organize farm workers with the
successful effort by the United Farm Workers in 1965-1972, Jenkins
and Perrow found no difference in the levels of farm worker
discontent, the talents and dedication of the organizers, or the
methods of contention. The difference between success and failure,
they concluded, was the support of outside "liberal" groups like
church organizations and organized labor, which was far more
substantial for the later movement. The reaction of political elites
was also less hostile to the second effort. Jenkins and Perrow
conclude this scenario was not just fortuitous for the second
movement, it was a prerequisite for its success: "[flor a successful
outcome, movements by the 'powerless' require strong and sustained
outside support."20 2
198. As Rosa Brooks notes, it is inherently arrogant for rule of law funders
to try to "improve" other cultures considered to be deficient in the areas of justice
and rights. Brooks, supra note 51, at 2339. Brooks correctly concludes that this
kind of intervention, and a growing consensus on law and rights norms, is an
unavoidable product of the globally interrelated nature of 21st century society, not
to mention the international agreements codifying these norms. Id. at 2334. Of
course, this "arrogance" by more developed nations offers its own political
opportunities for indigenous law reform actors wishing to promote some aspects
of global North legal norms.
199. David Arnold, Gandhi 92 (2001) ("One cannot but be struck by the
extent to which India's saintly Mahatma and foremost peasant leader was
bankrolled by the capitalist class.").
200. See, e.g., Th6rn, supra note 171, at 31-33, 67 (describing how the anti-
apartheid movement and the Black Consciousness Movement were supported by
elite individuals and international organizations).
201. Jenkins & Perrow, supra note 188, at 266.
202. Id. at 251.
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The most obvious support which rule of law proponents can
provide indigenous rights advocates and service providers is financial
and technical assistance on reform advocacy, in keeping with the
tradition of social movements obtaining such resources from outside
individuals and organizations. International financial support may
be the only option for advocates challenging the status quo from
within their own countries, since they are by their contentious
actions disqualifying themselves from much of the possible funding
from their own government or country elites. °3 Support from the
development agencies is also consistent with an existing, if vastly
under-utilized, component of these agencies' "access to justice"
efforts. Although the World Bank organizations are prohibited by
their Articles of Agreement from interfering in the political affairs of
the countries they serve,2° there is precedent, albeit poorly funded
precedent, for Bank efforts to establish human rights, empower
women and minorities, and tackle governmental corruption.2 5 In
fact, the World Bank's "Justice for the Poor" program, based in seven
countries in East Asia and Africa, nurtures and supports local
initiatives working toward what the Bank itself calls "pro-poor"
justice reform.0 6 And USAID officials have reported that integration
of non-governmental organizations into their rule of law planning
efforts has caused the agency to devote increased attention and
support to human rights, legal services, advocacy, and civil society
actors.0 7
A. Organizations and Networks Prepared for Mobilization
Social movements are built on a foundation of organizers,
movement organizations, and networks of communication among
movement actors. Historical accounts of social movements usually
wind their way back to critical early action by organizers, with
notable examples including the U.S. student anti-war movement of
203. See Golub, supra note 134, at 21.
204. Articles of Agreement of the International Development Association
art. V, § 6, Jan. 26, 1960, 11 U.S.T. 2284, 439 U.N.T.S. 249.
205. See Golub, supra note 134, at 24; see also Hammergren, supra note 55,
at 299 (discussing how the World Bank is increasing its involvement with civil
society actors).
206. World Bank, Justice for the Poor, http://www.worldbank.orgjustice
forthepoor (last visited Oct. 12, 2009).
207. Hammergren, supra note 55, at 311.
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the 1960s20 and the Muslim Pashtun movement °9 and Indian
independence movement of the early and mid-twentieth century.
2 10
For example, the Montgomery, Alabama bus boycott of 1955 and
1956, a landmark development in the U.S. civil rights movement,
was originally organized not by Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. or other
ministers who subsequently became the movement's spokespersons,
but by the lesser known E.D. Nixon, president of the Montgomery,
Alabama NAACP, and Jo Ann Robinson of the local Women's
Political Council.2 1' Within the civil rights movement, successful
organizers included those who came from within the ranks of the
local aggrieved, like Nixon and Robinson, as well as external civil
rights activists, such as the students from Northern states who were
the principal organizers in many Mississippi locations.2 12 To build the
movements, these organizers tapped into existing organizations like
the NAACP and African American churches and created new
networks of communication among movement actors.
Such networks are crucial. Scholars have concluded that the
ability of social movements to grow and recruit new members is
directly related to the extent to which the movements are linked to
other groups.213 For example, the timing of the U.S. women's
liberation movement of the mid-1960s was dependent chiefly upon
the creation of new networks of communication among women who
had shared un-networked grievances for decades.214
1. Examples of Organizations Prepared for
Mobilization
The nodes of connectivity for those rule of law networks are
present in the wide variety of grassroots rights advocacy
organizations that currently exist throughout the developing world.
208. Jo Freeman, On the Origins of Social Movements, in Waves of Protest
7, 12-14 (Jo Freeman & Victoria Johnson eds., 1999)
209. Mohammad Raqib, The Muslim Pashtun Movement of the North-West
Frontier of India: 1930-1934, in Waging Nonviolent Struggle 113, 113-134 (Gene
Sharp ed., 2005).
210. Tilly, supra note 170, at 90-92.
211. Killian, supra note 169, at 772; see also Taylor Branch, Parting the
Waters 129-136 (1988) (explaining the critical role played by E.D. Nixon and Jo
Ann Robinson in Montgomery).
212. Charles M. Payne, I've Got the Light of Freedom 132-33 (1995).
213. David A. Snow, et al., Social Movements: A Micro-Structural Approach
to Differential Recruitment, 45 Am. Soc. Rev. 787, 797-98 (1980).
214. Freeman, supra note 208, at 11.
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In Leah J.'s home country of Kenya, a recent conference on legal
empowerment for the poor included civil society groups devoted to
land reform, women's empowerment, children's advocacy, and HIV
support.2 15 The Law Society of Kenya has mobilized lawyers to
advocate for human rights and provide direct legal assistance to the
poor,"' a network of community-based groups in the Malindi district
have successfully organized to win concessions on access to water,
217
and women's groups have formed to provide civic legal education and
rescue girls from early marriages.2 18 This is not a new phenomenon in
Kenya. In the waning days of colonialism, there were many examples
of African civil society actors creating political will for dramatic
change. One example is the Kikuyu Central Association, an early
twentieth century advocacy organization focused on land issues,
which was led by a young Jomo Kenyatta, who later helped lead the
Kenya African Union (KAU). The KAU joined with other
organizations like the East African Trades Union Congress in the
campaign that would eventually lead to independence from Britain
and Kenyatta's installation as Kenya's first president.2 9
Throughout Africa, there is a thriving civil society devoted to
human rights advocacy at a local level, including community-based
legal advocacy efforts in Somalia,22 ° South Africa,22' Liberia,222
Malawi,223 Burkina Faso, :2 4 Ghana,22 5 Togo,226 Sierra Leone,227 and
215. Comm'n on Legal Empowerment of the Poor, supra note 60, at 1-2.
216. Daniels & Trebilock, supra note 54, at 126.
217. Lucie E. White, African Lawyers Harness Human Rights To Face
Down Global Poverty, 60 Me. L. Rev. 165, 168 (2008).
218. Ayuko & Chopra, supra note 79, at 37.
219. Martin Meredith, The Fate of Africa 80-90 (2005).
220. See, e.g., Samuels, supra note 26, at 30 (discussing the community-
based advocacy programs in Somalia).
221. See, e.g., Kalla & Cohen, supra note 85, at 28 (highlighting the
different strategies used by the government of South Africa to bring legal services
to the poor).
222. See, e.g., Achievements in Building and Maintaining the Rule of Law:
MSI's Studies in LAC, E&E, AFR and ANE, Occasional Paper Series
(USAID/Office of Democracy and Governance, Wash., D.C.), Nov. 2002, at 131,
available at http://www.usaid.gov/our-work/democracy-and-governance/
publications/pdfs/pnacr220.pdf (recounting the history of Liberia since its
founding in 1821 and summarizing recent post-conflict developments in efforts to
establish and support the rule of law).
223. See, e.g., id. at 133-34 (describing challenges to the development of
democratic institutions in Malawi, and summarizing the contributions of USAID
and other entities in strengthening the judicial system, rights education, and
democratic institutions).
224. See, e.g., Daniel Manning, World Bank, The Role of Legal Services
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other locations. Grassroots organizations are poised to play critical
roles in law reform advocacy throughout Latin America, reports
Maria Dakiolas, where "[t]hey are particularly effective in drawing
attention to issues or groups that may otherwise be overlooked or
whose political voice is the weakest. Women, ethnic minorities, and
other groups who do not always enjoy equitable representation in
formal institutions often form NGOs [non-governmental
organizations] in order to make their voices heard."2 8 Dakolias
provides a broad discussion of how these Latin American reform
organizations network in classic social movement fashion.229
2. Civil Society Actors in Ideal Positions to Effect
Law Reform
A key advantage that such indigenous grassroots advocates
possess over "top-down" law reform actors is their demonstrated
ability to work in both formal and customary legal forums, the latter
of which presents an area of clear weakness for current rule of law
interventions. 230 These civil society actors have shown a willingness
to use paralegals and community advocates in addition to licensed
attorneys in direct representation, and have engaged effectively with
community leaders who often take the place of formal judges in
dispute resolution.231 For example, in 2004, legal advocates in
Organizations in Attacking Poverty 50 (1999), available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTAFRREGTOPGENDER/Resources/RoleLe
gal-en.pdf (describing the role of the Association of Women Jurists in
establishing literacy and legal training programs in Burkina Faso).
225. See, e.g., White, supra note 217, at 168-69 (describing the Ghana
Legal Resource Center's successful use of community organizing techniques and
litigation to persuade the Ghanaian government to back away from its system of
"cash and carry" health policy).
226. See, e.g., Manning, supra note 224, at 51 ("ITihe World Bank has
provided grants for institutional reform projects in Mali and Togo which, among
other things, support legal literacy and legal aid program[s].").
227. See, e.g., Vivek Maru, Between Law and Society: Paralegals and the
Provision of Justice Services in Sierra Leone and Worldwide, 31 Yale J. Int'l L.
427 (2006) (arguing that paralegals in Sierra Leone offer valuable legal services,
including legal education and legal representation with a focus on concrete
solutions while employing not only legal tools but also the more flexible tools of a
social movement).
228. Dakolias, supra note 137, at S48.
229. Id. at S49-S52.
230. See Samuels, supra note 26, at 18-19.
231. See Kalla & Cohen, supra note 85, at 29 (noting that paralegals
provide an important source of legal assistance in Kenya by creating awareness
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western Kenya responded to the problem of women being denied
their rights to inheritance by facilitating discussions among Luo
ethnic group elders about their community's values in regard to
women's well-being. Advocates discovered that the elders actually
held a great deal of pride in a community self-image of supporting
and protecting women. When confronted by advocates with evidence
that the treatment of many Luo widows did not meet that standard,
the elders changed the tribal practice to install women as trustees of
the land after their husbands' death, thus guaranteeing a woman's
right to remain on the family property.232
Referencing this kind of legal advocacy success by civil
society actors, Stephen Golub has called for a switch in the rule of
law paradigm away from a focus on state institutions and elites and
toward "legal empowerment," the use of legal services, and other
development activities that are "grounded in grassroots needs but
can translate that community-level work into impact on national
laws and institutions."2 33
As Golub notes, indigenous organizations working on legal
issues have potential value and impact beyond rule of law or even
human rights concerns. The World Bank, USAID and other rule of
law actors have noted repeatedly that strong civil society
organizations help alleviate poverty and broadly empower the
citizenry,234 and Ernest Gellner and other commentators see the
of human rights and providing referrals to appropriate services); see also
Samuels, supra note 26, at 18 (stating that informal, traditional justice systems
often exist even when formal frameworks have failed).
232. Chopra, supra note 87, at 2-3.
233. Golub, supra note 134, at 103; see also Stephen Golub, Make Justice
the Organizing Principle of the Rule of Law Field, 1 Hague J. on Rule L. 61, 61-
66 (2009), available at http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=
1&fid=4614144&jid=ROL&volumeId=l&issueId=01&aid=4614140 (arguing that
the concept of broadly defined "justice," including social and economic rights,
should replace the rule of law as the focus of international development agencies).
234. See, e.g., Civil Society Team, World Bank, World Bank-Civil Society
Engagement: Review of Fiscal Years 2002-2004, at ix (2005), available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/CSO/Resources/WorldBankCivilSocietyPro
gressReport_2002-2004.pdf (finding that a strong relationship between a civil
society and the World Bank can improve development results); USAID, Why Civil
Society Matters for Democracy, http://www.usaid.gov/our-work/democracy
_and-governance/technical areas/civil-society/ (noting that civil society can
"transform" non-democratic countries and encourage reconciliation in post-
conflict situations).
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existence of a vibrant civil society of advocates as a precondition to
democracy itself.
235
One obvious role for rule of law funders is to support these
groups in forging the networks that will enable them to fully realize
their potential for making a positive impact on their communities.
Successful models for that kind of networking support already exist:
Bangladeshi human rights advocates found their influence increased
after an external law reform funder, The Ford Foundation, enabled
them to band together to share information and strategies.236
Similarly, Alternative Law Groups (ALGs) in the Philippines have
created a network of over twenty small organizations working on
legal empowerment issues such as land reform, labor issues, and the
laws regarding rape and assault.237
3. Conclusion
Social movement outcome research, including Aldon Morris's
powerful analysis of the 1960 African American sit-in movement (a
pivotal development in the U.S. civil rights struggle),238 shows that
the relative strength of these organizations, as measured in terms of
size, network ties, internal organization and fundraising ability, will
ultimately determine the success of the rule of law movement.239
Properly supported, existing and evolving law reform groups and
their leaders are poised to play the pivotal roles that social
movement historians, 240 along with iconic movement organizers like
Saul Alinsky, 24' have long predicted. As Kirsti Samuels notes in
discussing the future of the efforts to instill rule of law, "Domestic
political reform pressure and local political reform champions are
235. Ernest Gellner, Conditions of Liberty 184-89 (1994); see also Eric
Dannenmaier, Democracy in Development: Toward a Legal Framework for the
Americas, 11 Tul. Envtl. L.J. 1, 5 (1997) ("In a society where individuals are not
historically inclined to join a policy dialog directly, these [civil society]
organizations are an important proxy for the public voice.").
236. Stephen Golub, From the Village to the University: Legal Activism in
Bangladesh, in Many Roads to Justice, supra note 196, at 127, 133-34.
237. Stephen Golub, Participatory Justice in the Philippines, in Many
Roads to Justice, supra note 196, at 197, 197-226.
238. Aldon Morris, Black Southern Student Sit-In Movement: An Analysis
of Internal Organization, 46 Am. Soc. Rev. 744, 765 (1981).
239. See Gamson, supra note 181, at 89-108.
240. Craig Jenkins, Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social
Movements, 9 Ann. Rev. Soc. 522, 531 (1983).
241. Saul Alinsky, Reveille for Radicals 85-88 (Random House Inc. 1969)
(1946).
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essential for real [rule of law] change. There must be a systematic
focus on identifying and supporting 'agents of change' who have a
driving will to reform. 
" 242
Social movement research has grown increasingly interested
in the concept of framing. Erving Goffman, in his influential 1974
book, Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of the
Experience, outlined the process of individuals constructing their own
reality by organizing events in a way that gives coherent meaning
and guides their future action.243 In their efforts to create political
will for reform, social movement actors are challenged to create
enduring frames that diagnose the problems, articulate solutions,
and then motivate the key populations. 24 Framing includes the use
of provocative words and language to mobilize action, with a notable
example in the contemporary abortion debate being advocates'
labeling of late-term procedures as "partial-birth abortion."245 As
Robert Benford and David Snow put it, the social movement
organizer's task is to create frames that will "move people from the
balcony to the barricades."24 6
X. GRASSROOTS LEGAL ADVOCATES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR
FRAMING
Grassroots legal advocates possess a uniquely advantaged
position from which to devise compelling frames. Every paralegal's
intervention to help a woman escape domestic violence and every
attorney's successful effort to ensure inheritance rights for orphans is
a victory not just for the individual clients but also for rule of law
writ large. Properly leveraged, the stories emerging from this direct
representation can explain a broader pattern of injustice in a
dramatic and personal way, and thus has "framing" value far beyond
the individual cases involved.
Blaming a dysfunctional system and its political leaders for a
widespread lack of justice may seem intuitive, but research on the
psychological phenomenon of "system justification" shows a common
242. Samuels, supra note 26, at 21.
243. Erving Goffman, Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of
the Experience 7 (1974).
244. Robert Benford & David A. Snow, Framing Process and Social
Movements: An Overview and Assessment, 26 Ann. Rev. Soc. 611, 615 (2000).
245. Anne W. Esacove, Dialogic Framing: The Framing/ Counterframing of
"Partial-Birth"Abortion, 74 Soc. Inquiry 70, 72 (2004).
246. Benford & Snow, supra note 244, at 615.
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human predisposition to defend and justify the status quo, even
among those who are most harmed by the existing system.247
Therefore, social movements must proceed around issues that are
framed in sympathetic terms that are understandable to the
population at large, the media, and the leaders who are being
pressed to make changes. Donald Reitzes and Dietrich Reitzes point
out that "symbolic interactionist" social psychologists and community
organizers like Alinsky share the recognition that organized action
comes about when private grievances are redefined as a community's
shared social problem. 248 Advocates who directly confront tangible
ground-level instances of injustice are ideal frame articulators, since
empirical credibility of the collective action frame is a key factor in
whether the frame will have resonance.24 9 For example, arguing from
experience that petty police bribery is not just a problem for one or
two unlucky people, but rather a policy problem for an entire political
district, provides the connectivity that transforms one legal client's
complaint into a collective call for systemic change.
These framing opportunities are not lost on legal advocates
throughout the developing world, who demonstrate that there is no
"either/or" choice to be made between the roles of providing direct
legal representation and making calls for broader law reform. Many
advocates have already shown their willingness to take the lessons
learned, and the credibility earned, from representing individuals to
provide community messages of education and empowerment.2 1' For
example, Bangladeshi legal service providers are very active
"framers" of justice issues. They investigate and expose issues
including police torture, deaths in garment factories, dowry-related
abuses, official responses to violent crimes against women and
children, and a lack of secret balloting in village voting; they engage
247. See generally Gary Blasi & John T. Jost, System Justification Theory
and Research: Implications for Law, Legal Advocacy, and Social Justice, 94 Cal.
L. Rev. 1119, 1119 (2006) (arguing that recent scientific research has revealed
that the motive to defend and justify the social status quo, even among those who
are seemingly most disadvantaged by it, often motivates human behavior).
248. Donald C. Reitzes & Dietrich C. Reitzes, Alinsky in the 1980s: Two
Contemporary Chicago Community Organizations, 28 Soc. Q. 265, 267 (1986).
249. Benford & Snow, supra note 244, at 620.
250. See, e.g., id. at 615 (citing several studies showing how movements
identify "victims" of injustice and amplify their victimization into "injustice
frames" created in advance of collective protest).
251. See, e.g., Manning, supra note 224, at 40 (discussing how the work of
one legal services provider emboldens groups of the poor to act on their own
behalf).
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in high-profile litigation to stop slum evictions, they actively cultivate
the media, and they mobilize the community to conduct legislative
lobbying.2 2 Advocates in a World Bank-sponsored program in
Ecuador that included legal services programs for poor women, drew
upon their ground-level experiences to generate a comprehensive
report and a national workshop that led to broad reform
recommendations. 3 A Haitian legal advocacy group, Bureau des
Avocats Internationaux, directly represents prisoners and other
victims of human rights abuses while simultaneously seeking policy
changes by publicizing their clients' plight within Haiti and to the
U.S. government, international media and a network of Haiti-
oriented U.S. activists. 4
During the 1970s and 1980s, legal advocates in Peru, Chile,
and Argentina responded to authoritarian governments by
representing victims of political suppression and violence. Their
public exposition of the abuse of their clients' rights led to
international condemnation and supplied indigenous dissenters with
empirically verifiable accounts of repression that countered
government "frames" of fairness and freedom.2 5 The inherent conflict
and personal stories of legal cases make for compelling media
coverage on human rights grievances, as the Constitutional Rights
Project in Nigeria discovered in the 1990s when it initiated several
cases challenging the government's abuse of power. The Rights
Project found that the media in that repressive environment gave
coverage to court actions even when mass demonstrations were not
reported on. 6 Although the authoritarian governments ensured that
these groups' legal challenges were not successful on an individual
level, the widespread dissemination of the facts and arguments
associated with the cases has been hailed as one of the most effective
strategies for resistance to these regimes, since the advocacy process
triggered and legitimated internal and external criticism of the
governments. 7
252. Id., at 23-31; see also Golub, supra note 236, at 143 (describing a legal
service provider's challenge to prisoner abuse and non-secret balloting).
253. McInerney, supra note 132, at 140-42.
254. Brian Concannon, The Bureau des Avocats Internationaux, a Victim-
Centered Approach, in Effective Strategies for Protecting Human Rights 61, 62,
66 (David Barnhizer ed., 2001).
255. Fruhling, supra note 196, at 62-66.
256. Helen Hershkoff & Aubrey McCutcheon, Public Interest Litigation, in
Many Roads to Justice, supra note 196, at 283, 288.
257. Fruhling, supra note 196, at 64.
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A. The Framing of Galvanizing Events
The framing process is particularly crucial when the aspiring
movement is presented with a galvanizing moment or crisis. High-
profile grievances, whether the subject of formal litigation or not, are
often ideal vehicles for providing both the galvanizing moment and
the opportunity to frame the issue as an injustice applicable to a
broad population."8 The most iconic U.S. example of both framing
and galvanizing is the litigation challenging racial segregation in
public schools, which culminated in the 1954 U.S. Supreme Court
decision in Brown v. Board of Education. 9 Ironically, the Brown
decision had little immediate effect on school segregation, but it has
been described by Richard Kluger as "the catalytic event that began
the Second Reconstruction paralleling the one after the Civil War"
and the parent of the mass civil rights movement.2
Similarly, an International Court of Justice ruling in 1971
against continued South African control and apartheid-themed
occupation over an area then called "South-West Africa" triggered
statements of support from church leaders, educators and tribal
chiefs. Widespread strikes soon followed that led to more favorable
labor agreements and continued the momentum toward the eventual
liberation of "South-West Africa" into the independent nation of
Namibia.26' Subsequent public interest litigation in southern Africa
helped chip away at tangible components of apartheid, such as pass
laws and prisoner abuse.262
B. Repertoires of Contention
In the case of widespread efforts to instill human rights and
rule of law, human rights advocates have yet to determine the ideal
258. See William Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of
Disputes: Naming, Blaming and Claiming, 15 Law and Soc'y Rev. 631, 639-40
(1980); see also Dakolias, supra note 137, at S45-S46 (noting that "test" cases in
developing countries can engage the press and public).
259. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
260. Richard Kluger, Simple Justice 753-54 (2004).
261. Gene Sharp, African Laborers Strike, Namibia, in Waging Nonviolent
Struggle, supra note 209, at 205-216.
262. See Richard Abel, Politics by Other Means 60-65 (1995); see also
Stephen Golub, Battling Apartheid and Building a New South Africa, in Many
Roads to Justice, supra note 196, at 19, 24-30 (litigation challenging apartheid
laws exploited the independence of the courts and the inherent contradictions of
the discriminatory system).
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techniques for collective action ("repertoires of contention"). However,
documented instances of citizens of the developing world mobilizing
around rights issues may provide a glimpse of the future forms of
collective action that will be employed to expand and enforce rights
guarantees.
A legal-clinic-turned-law-reform organization in Ghana
organized public marches, petition drives, and litigation to challenge
a requirement that cash be paid up front before accessing health
care.2 63  Senegalese women mobilized against female genital
mutilation by lobbying religious and traditional leaders-among
other tactics, through the use of dramatic displays of razor blades
formerly used in the procedure-and led the successful effort to
legally ban the practice in several villages.2M In South Africa,
organized women's groups played a key role in ending apartheid
through direct action including strikes, civil disobedience and
protests,265  and then engaged in nonviolent disruptions of
constitutional negotiations until women were accorded a significant
role in the process.266 A Chilean environmental advocacy group sued
and halted a concession of public land to the timber industry.26 7
Although public interest litigation may seem like an obvious
choice for legal advocates, social movement history suggests caution
before adopting lawsuits as a reform strategy. Litigation, because it
can be costly, slow, and overly reliant on a few elite attorney actors is
not always the best repertoire of contention for a movement. 68
Empirical analysis of law reform efforts in the U.S. have concluded
that the courts tend to follow behind popular reform movements, not
263. White, supra note 217, at 168-69.
264. Sarah Crowe & Molly Melching, UNICEF, Ending female genital
mutilation and cutting in Senegal, (Nov. 24, 2005),
http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/senegal-30046.html.
265. Gay W. Seidman, "No Freedom Without the Women:w " Mobilization and
Gender in South Africa, 1970-1992, 18 Signs 291, 302 (1993); see also Pamela E.
Brooks, Boycotts, Buses, and Passes 202-38 (2008) (describing particularly
significant individuals and occurrences in the South African women's movement
to end apartheid).
266. Gay W. Seidman, Gendered Citizenship: South Africa's Democratic
Tradition and the Construction of a Gendered State, 13 Gender and Soc'y 287, 294
(1999).
267. Dannenmaier, supra note 235, at 31.
268. See Michael McCann & Helena Silverstein, Rethinking Law's
Allurements: A Relational Analysis of Social Movement Lawyers in the U.S., in
Cause Lawyering 261, 262-64 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 1998).
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initiate them.2 69 In contrast, the extra-institutional pressure of
protests has been shown to have a demonstrable effect on policy
outcomes. z7 Even an important lawsuit does not call upon the
movement actors to publicly demonstrate their depth and breadth,
an important component of advocacy that Charles Tilly has labeled
"WUNC" (Worthiness, Unity, Numbers, Commitment) displays.27'
C. Alternatives to Litigation
When litigation is not the ideal choice, legal actors can turn
to other repertoires of contention. In 2007, lawyers in Pakistan
conducted high-profile street demonstrations against President
General Pervez Musharrafs attempts to dismiss the country's chief
justice and impose emergency rule.272 Lucie White writes of an
example of how lawyers teamed with traditional social movement
organizers to educate and empower black villagers to block a forced
removal in apartheid South Africa.273 Frank Bloch has chronicled
how law school clinics have increased access to justice, partly
through legal literacy programming, in South America, Africa, and
South and East Asia.274 An historical example of the key non-
litigation role that lawyers can play in framing a grievance and
triggering broader action is found in the removal of Guatemalan
dictator General Jorge Ubico y Castaneda in 1944, when 45 lawyers
wrote a series of articles in a Guatemala City newspaper and became
the first to ever publicly call out the General about corruption in the
judiciary. The articles triggered teacher and student protests,
demonstrations, and a public strike. Within a month, Ubico
resigned.275
Multi-country reviews of legal advocacy programs by the
World Bank27 6 and the Ford Foundation 277 show that rule of law
269. See Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About
Social Change? 70-71 (2d ed. 2008).
270. Meyer & Minkoff, supra note 180, at 1479.
271. Tilly, supra note 170, at 4.
272. Jane Perlez & David Rhode, Pakistan Attempts to Crush Protests By
Lawyers, N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 2007, at Al.
273. Lucie E. White, To Learn and Teach Lessons From Driefontein on
Lawyering and Power, 1988 Wis. L. Rev. 699, 723-38 (1988).
274. Frank S. Bloch, Access to Justice and the Global Clinical Movement,
28 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol'y 111, 127-28 (2008).
275. Gene Sharp, Ousting a Guatemalan Dictator, 1944, in Waging
Nonviolent Struggle, supra note 209, at 149, 149-155.
276. Manning, supra note 224.
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interventions work best when they support law reform advocates who
leverage their credibility and knowledge from grassroots
representation to use a variety of techniques to make convincing
arguments for reform. Cambodian legal service providers, informed
by the daily experience of representing poor tenants and landowners,
helped develop a proposal for land law reform,"' South African legal
advocates supplemented rights-oriented litigation with nonviolent
resistance to attempts to remove black individuals to "homelands,"
and helped inform and empower the country's labor movement,
which played a key role in opposing apartheid.2 79 Burkina Faso
advocates launched legal literacy programs,2 0 Chinese legal service
providers engaged in both high-profile litigation and public reporting
on behalf of women workers, 28 1 and Croatian advocates engaged in
community human rights education.8 2
Given the prevalence of settings in the developing world
where formal litigation is overshadowed by informal application of
customary or religious law, it is important to note the transformative
opportunities presented by rights advocacy in these traditional
forums. Although traditional legal forums may be imperfect, they are
not static. As one observer stated: "They are continuously evolving
socio-economic cultural constructs affected and altered by internal
and external forces which place pressures on those within."2 83 Inside
and outside of formal legal systems, indigenous advocates are
positioned to access a variety of repertoires of contention to pressure
for change, and some are already doing so on a scale limited by their
scant resources.28 4
277. Fruhling, supra note 196.
278. Manning, supra note 224, at 46; see also USAID, Defending Citizens'
Land Rights, http://www.usaid.gov/stories/cambodia/ss-cb-legal.pdf (last visited
Oct. 18, 2009) (discussing the Community Legal Education Center's success in
protecting the land rights of local Cambodian residents).
279. Golub, supra note 262, at 32-33.
280. Id. at 50.
281. Manning, supra note 224, at 52; see also Aubrey McCutcheon,
Contributing to Legal Reform in China, in Many Roads to Justice, supra note 196,
at 181-84, 195 (discussing work done by the Peking Women's Centre and the
Qianzi Women's Centre in promoting women's legal rights).
282. Manning, supra note 224, at 53-54.
283. Justice for the Poor: Kenya, World Bank, Gender Action Plan:
Preliminary Assessments of Women's Access to Land Rights in Agricultural
Communities in Kenya 3 (2008).
284. See Atsango Chetsoni et al., Swedish Int'l Dev. Cooperation Agency,
Promoting Women's Rights and Enhancing Gender Equality in Kenya 24-26
(2006); see also Chopra, supra note 87, at 4 (detailing the small scale project that
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D. Conclusion
Just as there is no boilerplate set of repertoires of contention,
there is no instruction manual setting out a step-by-step sequence for
social movements. But the research of David Meyer and Debra
Minkoff on African American civil rights movements,285 among
others, suggest that movement actors would ideally build
organizational strength and a record of issue framing while
preparing for "galvanizing moments" of ripe opportunity for protests
and rapid change. Viewed through this prism, a developing nation's
rule of law movement calling for broader and deeper recognition of
women's rights, for example, is likely now in a stage preceding
dramatic protests such as the bus boycotts or sit-ins of the U.S. civil
rights movement or the mass pro-democracy demonstrations in
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. At this stage, the key rule of
law movement actors are the legal services providers and grassroots
law reform advocates who are building expectations of justice, forging
networks of supporters, and framing the case for human rights. By
supporting these efforts, rule of law funders can play a critical role in
laying the foundation for movement actors to seize the opportunity
for substantial, transformative change.
XI. CONCLUSION
A little over one year after being driven off her land, Leah J.
was attending a support group meeting for HIV patients in Eldoret
when she heard about a new one-attorney legal aid program that was
connected with the HIV treatment center. Leah told her story to the
attorney, Juliet Mule, who immediately went to Kenya's High Court
in Eldoret and obtained an order allowing Leah to withdraw 25,000
Kenyan shillings, about $322 U.S., from a bank account that was in
Leah's husband's name. Leah is using the money to rent a home and
pay the children's school fees, as well as for the transportation and
search fees she needs to help Mule document title to the land owned
by Leah's husband and taken by his family.
When Leah has the family land restored to her, she dreams of
starting a business selling second-hand shoes. She knew all along she
had the right to the marital property, but she also had no idea that a
poor person like her could ever hope to enforce that right. When she
the Kenya National Human Rights Commission undertook to find innovative
solutions for women facing disinheritance).
285. Meyer & Minkoff, supra note 180, at 1484.
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relates the positive turn in her fortunes after finding a path to
justice, Leah's voice becomes stronger. "I've talked to the other
widows to let them know," she says.28 6
Juliet Mule is letting other widows know, too. She has spoken
about legal rights to support groups for people living with HIV/AIDS,
and is eager to make presentations to schools and community groups,
conduct media outreach, and to train local elders and other
community leaders in the law. But Mule's fledgling organization, the
Legal Aid Centre of Eldoret,287 is just a two-person shop funded solely
by small donations from private U.S. supporters, and Mule spends
her days and evenings responding to the glut of legal emergencies
like Leah's. 8 8
Juliet Mule, like countless other direct legal services
providers and community-based rights advocates across the
developing world, stands ready to help grow the elusive political will
for the rule of law. Mule and her contemporaries are living proof that
significant elements of successful rule of law social movements are
already in place: political opportunity exists in many developing
countries, movement actors are ready to frame justice issues so as to
garner popular support, advocates like Mule and their clients like
Leah J. are forging networks of both advocates and the aggrieved,
and there are many proven models of effective repertoires of
contention for law reform. After two decades of misguided
investments, rule of law funders must seize this opportunity to
support social movement actors who can shape and deliver rule of
law from the grassroots up.
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